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[Stay granted by state court] 
Cert to Ohio S Ct (Corrigan, Herbert, 
Celebreeze, P. Brown; O'Neill, 
Stern, W. Brown, dissenting) 
State/Criminal Timely (by ext.) 
SUMMARY: This petn raises several challenges to Ohio's 
death penalty statute, similar to those raised in Bell v. Ohio, 
including a strong set of facts on which to consider the aider 
and abettor/nontriggerman issue. In addition, petr claims that 
jurors with scruples against capital punishment were unfairly 
excluded from the - jury, that the P+Osecutor commented on 
petr's failure to testify, and that the Ohio S Ct denied petr's 
,,, - - 2 
right to a fair warning of a criminal prohibition by giving 
- retroactive application to a new construction of the Ohio statute 
on the punishment of an aider and abettor as a principal. 
-
( -
FACTS: Petr met three companions (Parker, Dew, and Baxter) 
and a male relative during a weekend in New Jersey, bailed her -brother James Lockett out of jail, and drove with the five to 
Akron, Ohio. Because two of the group had no money with which 
to fund their trip home, Parker and Dew discussed pawning a ring. 
Petr and James Lockett joined the conversation, and petr suggested 
instead committing a robbery and mentioned several suitable stores. 
None of the four had a gun, so petr's brother suggested robbing 
a pawnshop where they could ask to see a gun, load it, and then 
use it to rob the shop. Parker already had several cartridges 
and, at the suggestion of James Lockett, elected to be the trig-
german. Petr offered to lead the group to the shop, but suggested 
she not go in because the pawn operator knew her. 
In the actual robbery, Dew and James Lockett entered the 
store to pretend to pawn a ring. Parker came in behind them, 
asked to see a pistol, loaded it with two cartridges, and announced 
the stickup. He pointed the gun at the pawnbroker with his 
finger on the trigger. He later testified that the gun went 
off when the pawnbroker grabbed at it. The trio ran out and 
Parker entered a car where petr was waiting, running the engine. 
Petr took the gun from Parker and put it in her purse, later 
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Parker, the triggerman, was offered and accepted a plea of 
aggravated murder, with a di.smissal of the specification of 
aggravating circumstances and a robbery charge, in exchange 
for his testimony against the others. Two weeks before trial, 
petr was offered a plea of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated 
robbery in exchange for her cooperation, which she rejected. 
Immediately before trial, petr was offered a plea of aggra-
vated murder, which she also rejected. Subsequently she was . 
convicted in a jury trial of aggravated murder with specifications 
of two aggravating circumstances, and of aggravated robbery. 
The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and sentenced 
her to death. 
Dew and James Lockett were offered the same plea of 
voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery, which they 
- rejected, and were convicted in separate trials of aggravated 
murder with one specification and of aggravated robbery. The 
trial court found mitigating circumstances in Dew's case and 
sentenced him to life. James Lockett was originally sentenced 
to death, but his conviction was subsequently reversed. After 
a mistrial and then a third trial, the brother was found guilty 
and has not yet been sentenced. Parker, who testified as the 
main witness at petr's trial, was sentenced to life. 
DECISION BELOW: The Ohio S Ct affirmed the conviction 
by a vote of 4-3. The dissenters complained first that the 
majority had misread the current Ohio statute on aiding and 
abetting, Ohio R.C. 2923.O3(A). That statute provides "No 
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commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: 
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense." The majority 
held that the culpability required for aggravated murder was 
established because petr had participated in the planning and 
commission of the robbery and had acquiesced in the use of a 
weapon. It might be "reasonably expected by all the participants 
that the victim's life would be endangered by the manner and 
means of performing the act conspired", which amounted to "a 
purposeful intent to kill." The dissenters argued that there 
was no evidence that the petr had an "actual purpose or intent 
to kill." The standard used in the jury instructions would 
establish culpability on the part of any accomplice to an armed 
robbery whenever a killing occurred, however "unintentionally", 
in the course of the robbery. Second, the dissenters complained 
that the death penalty was disproportionate to the offense com-
mitted here, and was arbitrary insofar as its imposition depended 
on the acts of persons other than petr.l/ 
1/ See dissent, 49 Ohio St.2d at 70-71 (Petn App A): 
A conclusive judicial presumption that one person 
had the specific intent to commit murder, because his 
confederate had such intent, necessarily will result 
in some accomplices to aggravated robbery receiving 
the statutory punishment for aggravated robbery, while 
others, for the same acts, will be sentenced to death 
because of the acts and purposes of others. Theim-
position of the death penalty in the latter cases is 





CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION: 
A. OHIO DEATH PENALTY . Petr raises five challenges 
to the constitutiona lity of the Ohio death penalty statute. 
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(1) The statute places an unconstitutional 
limitation on the consideration of mitigating circum-
stances. The three mitigating factors permitted 
under Ohio law!:-/ are too narrow to accord petr the 
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects 
of [her] character and record" required under Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). In 
particular, petr's youth, previous good character, 
lack of prior conviction for any violent crime, 
excellent prospects for rehabilitation, and lack 
of participation in the killing could not be con-
sidered under the Ohio procedure, as well as the 
fact that the actual killing was not intentional. 
Resp replies that in Ohio v. Bell, 48 Ohio St.2d -- --
270 (1976), the Ohio S Ct held that age and prior 
record could be considered in the mitigation hearing 
and that in Ohio v. Black, 48 Ohio St.2d 262 (1976), 
the Ohio S Ct held that all aspects of mental condition 
2/ Ohio R.C. 2929.04(B)(l)-(3): 
-
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facili-
tated it. 
(2) It is unlike ly that the offense would have 
been committed, but for the fact that the offender 
was under dures s, coercion, or strong provocation. 
(3) The offense was primarily the product of 
the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though 






could be considered, including whether the offense 
was directly caused by that condition. 
6 
(2) The death penalty determination was not made 
by a jury. Petr had a Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a judgment of her peers as to the 
existence of mitigating circumstances and the appro-
priateness of the death penalty. Resp replies that 
judges will be less arbitrary in sentencing than jurors 
because they have experience, and that sentencing by 
the judge rather than jury was upheld in Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
(3) The statute penalizes exercise of the right 
to jury trial, in violation of United States v. Jackson, 
390 U.S. 570 (1968), since after a bench trial, the 
death penalty will result only if a panel of three 
judges (as opposed to one judge in jury trials) finds 
an absence of mitigating circumstances. Resp replies 
that there is no reason to assume three judges will 
be more lenient. 
(4) The statute impermissibly places on the 
defendant the burden of proving the existence of 
mitigating circumstances. Resp replies that lack 
of mitigating circumstances is not an element of the 
crime but rather is evidence presented at sentencing, 
and that Mullane y v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), does 
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(5) The statute is disproportionately severe for 
a person "who has not taken life, attempted to take 
life, or actually intended to take life." Crimes such 
as rape and assault with intent to kill are "decidedly 
more serious in that they involve direct, deliberate." 
and in the case of the latter, "life-threatening invasions 
of the physical integrity of another human being." 
Though petr participated in an armed robbery, she did 
not specifically intend that the gun be used. 
Resp replies that petr proposed the robbery, 
that she willingly participated in all steps of its 
planning and commission, and that the shooting "could 
reasonably have been anticipated" by petr. The guilty 
verdict rendered under Ohio R.C. 2923.03 is a judgment 
that petr was acting with the same specific intent as 
the actual triggerman . (This argument seer:r\S vulneraple 
since the jury was instructed on intent in regard to · 
petr according to an "anticipatable harm" standard, and 
yet might have believed that the triggerman himself 
had shot the pawnbroker intentionally.) 
These issues are the same as in Bell v. Ohio, No. 76-6513, 
and should be held for that case. 
B. INAPPROPRIATE VOIR DIRE. Petr contends that the 
voir dire conducted by the trial judge violated the standards of 
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exclusion of jurors only if it is "unmistakably clear •.. that 
their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from 
making an impartial decision. 11 Jurors h e re, says petr, were 
asked only whether they were willing to take an oath of affirma-
tion as jurors, knowing that a possibility of capital punish-
ment existed. This inquiry failed to go far enough to justify 
excusing jurors for cause, says petr, because they were not asked 
whether, having taken such an Y,ath, they would be unable to dis-
charge the ir duty fairly. To the objec~ion that the jury has no 
direct role in imposing the death sentence under the Ohio 
statute, petr answers (1) that where Ohio has chosen to 
"death-qualify" jurors at all, it must do so under the standards 
of Witherspoon, and (2) that the mitigating factors allowed under 
the Ohio statute are so narrow that the jury's decision on 
aggravating circumstances is usually a decision determining the 
ultimate penalty. 
Resp replies that no juror was discharged solely because he 
voiced a general objection to the death penalty. Indeed, one 
juror who expressed general objections to the death penalty but 
who said she could and would take the oath, was not e xcused for 
cause. Resp's view of the voir dire seems borne out by the 
record. The court's original question to the jurors was whether 
they "could take an oath to well and truely try this case, •.• 
could you take an oath and follow the law, or is your conviction 
so strong that you cannot take an oath, knowing that a possibility 




- - 9 
"Would any of you affirm to well and truely try this case." 
Petr's contention that these questions amounted to a permission 
to the jurors to excuse themselves from the case because of 
their scruples even though they were able to take the oath and 
impartially try the case, is an overreading of the trial judge's 
• I 
remarks. In addition, petr's counsel did not object to the 1~rors 
dismissal at the time, although a co-counsel who had conducted 
most of the voir dire, entered the courtroom somewhat later and 
made a belated objection. 
C. PROSECUTOR~S COMMENTS. Petr did not take the 
stand. In his summation the prosecutor stated six times in 
succession that the State's evidence was "uncontradicted" and 
"unrefuted", and then said there had been "Nothing. No evidence 
from the Defense." Petr argues that although the first six 
comments might have been understood by the jury as referring 
to petr's failure to call third-party witnesses, the "No evidence 
from the Defense" comment clearly referred to petr. Defense counsel 
had mistakenly remarked in the presence of the jury early in the 
trial that petr would take the stand, and the last comment was a 
deliberate attempt by the prosecutor to play on the jury's recollec-
tion of this. The verbal distinction between "from the Defense" 
and "from the Defendant" is too thin to excuse such a remark, 
says petr. 
Resp replies that in prior cases where a prosecutor has 
characterized his case as "unrefuted" and "uncontradicted", 
the federal courts have found error only when the defendant is 
-
4.. 
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the only person who could refute the prosecution's evidence. 
And prior to the remark "No evidence from the Defense", the 
prosecutor was discussing solely the evidence and testimony 
of third parties, allaying any danger that the remark was 
misunderstood. 
I agree with resp that the comments were not sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal here. 
D. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
Finally, petr contends that the Ohio S Ct's interpretation of 
the 1974 Ohio statute governing complicity was utterly disparate 
from any anticipatable construction of the statute~ To apply" 
the new construction to petr would deprive her of the "right to 
fair warning of a criminal prosecution", in violation of due 
- process. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
-
Specifically, until 1974 Ohio had a statute that allowed 
an aider and abettor to be punished as if he were the principal 
offender , whether or not he possessed the same mens rea as the 
principal, says petr. The new criminal code effective January 1, 
1974 (petr's crime took place in January 1975), provided that the 
aider and abettor could be punished as a principal only if he 
was "acting with the kind of culpability required for the cormni-
sion of an offense". The Ohio S Ct, says petr, "interpreted" the 
culpability provision out of existence. Petr was misled not only 
as to her primary conduct (in agreeing to participate in an armed 
robbery), but more importantly, in her conduct at trial in twice 
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Resp replies that the Ohio S Ct's reading of the new 
statute did require proof of culpability, and that a purposeful 
intent to kill was established here through proof of petr's 
participation in a criminal conspiracy reasonably likely to 
produce death. Petr was shown to be in agreement with regard 
to the use of "whatever means [were] reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the robbery ••• by means of force, violence and use 
of a deadly weapon." Under such circumstances "a killing might 
be reasonably expected." There was no surprise in this inter-
pretation since the Legislative Service Commission Committee 
Comments to the complicity section stated that it codified 
existing case law with respect to aiding and abetting, and 
the Ohio S Ct had interpreted the pre-1974 statute as requiring 
the same showing that an aider ·and a.bettor intentionally engaged 
in a criminal enterprise "reasonably likely to produce death" 
before he could be punished for murder as a principal. The 
dissenters in Ohio S Ct differed over whether this was a correct 
interpretation of the new statute, but recognized that prior 
Ohio case law had enunciated the same rule. 
The fallacy in petr's argument, it seems to me, is that 
the Ohio S Ct rule1 that intentional endangerment in the course 
of a felony where a death occurs amounts to intention to kill, 
is a rule that holds for triggermen as ,much as for aiders 
and abettors. Even if Parker had testified that the gun went off 
wholly, accidentally while he was pointing it at the pawnbroker, 
that would have sufficed under Ohio law to establish a murder 
12 ,. - -
t{ 
charge. Thus petr is being held to the same standard of 
- culpability as if she were a principal offender. 
-
-
Hold for Bell v. Ohio, No. 76-6513, on the death penalty 
issues. None of the other issues seems certworthy. 
There is a response. 
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BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell January 17, 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
No. 76-6997, Lockett v. Ohio. 
The Court granted cert in this case primarily to consider whether 
a death sentence constitutionally may be imposed upon a person 
convicted of aiding and abetting a felony-murder. Although the 
case has been called a "non-triggerman" case, I shall not use 
that term. This is because the question whether a person performed 
the physical act that caused death probably should not be the ... 
sole criterion for deciding whether the death penalty 
::st~i;:"ay be impo::-;:-- Ino.;te; d, I thi; k that the ~M 






Because I have some doubt whether any clear-cut rule 
can be formulated for cases like this one, I first set forth 
in some detail the facts and interpretation of Ohio law 
under which Lockett was found guilty of aggravated murder. 
Then, in Part II, I sketch the parties' arguments, and in 
Part III,I discuss the problems in the case. In Part IV 
I set forth some of Lockett's background . 
2.-
Although I think this case should be reversed, I am 
undecided as between two grounds. One possibility is to hold 
that Lockett simply cannot be executed on the basis of the 
facts in this case. The other possibility is to hold that 
~
the Ohio statute is deficient because it does not allow the 
sentencing authority to take into account, as a mitigating -
r~ r 
factor, the fact that Lockett was only an aider and abettor 
to a felony-murder~ 
~/. 
~~µ ~ \ 





I. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW. 
Petitioner Sandra Lockett, a resident of Akron, Ohio, was 
visiting friends in Jersey City, N.J. on the weekend of 
January 11, 1975. While there she met Al Parker and Nathan 
Dew. On Monday, January 13, Dew bailed petitioner's brother 
James Lockett out of jail (we are not told the charges), and 
Parker, Dew, James Lockett, petitioner, and two other people 
drove together to Akron. 
The group arrived in Akron on January 14, and Parker, Dew, 
James Lockett, and petitioner went to the house where petitioner 
lived with her parents. Parker and Dew did not have enough 
money left to return to Jersey City, and they discussed pawning 
a ring of Dew's. During this conversat ion someone - Parker 
claims it was petitioner - suggested committing a robbery instead. 
Because none of the group had a gun, James Lockett came up with 
a plan to go to a pawn shop and ask to see a .38 caliber handgun. 
Parker, who did have four .38 cartridges in his possession, would 
load the gun they were shown and demand the shop owner's money. 
There was testimony that petitioner suggested a pawn shop 
that she knew and drove the group past it on the night of 
January 14, and that she decided to stay outside in the car 
during the robbery because the shop.'s owner knew her. Petitioner 
did not testify at her trial, but in statements to police and 
to probation officers she has said that no robbery was discussed 
in her presence on January 14 and that she thought they were 
- going to the pawn shop to pawn Dew's ring. 
:s 
- -
- In any event, at around noon on January 15 petitioner drove 
-
Parker, Dew, and James Lockett in Parker's car to Syd's Market 
Loan in downtown Akron. Dew and James Lockett entered the pawn 
shop first, followed by Parker about a minute later. Petitioner 
stayed outside in the car. 
Parker asked the shop's owner, 61-year-old Sidney Cohen, 
to see a .38 caliber gun. When Cohen produced a gun, Parker 
loaded it, pointed it at Cohen, and announced a stickup. Parker's 
story is that at this point Cohen either grabbed for or tried to 
shove away the gun, and it went off. Cohen was shot fatally in 
the chest. As he fell he activated a burglar alarm behind the 
shop's counter. 
Parker, Dew, and James Lockett fled the shop. Parker 
climbed into the car with petitioner, while the other two men 
left on foot. Parker and petitioner drove to the house of 
petitioner's aunt and stayed there ·a short time. Petitioner 
then called a taxi to take them to her parents' home. During 
this taxi ride police stopped them briefly for undisclosed 
reasons, and Parker hid the stolen .38 under the taxi's seat. 
At the end of his shift the taxi driver found the gun and turned 
it over to police. The driver testified at petitioner's trial 
that in directing him to her parents' home, petitioner had him 
take a longer than normal route that avoided the vicinity of 
Syd's Market Loan. 
After a police investigation all four participants were 
- arrested and indicted for aggravated murder and specifications. 
Lf 
- - ~ 
- Parker was allowed to plead guilty to aggravated murder without 
specifications, which precluded his being sentenced to death. 
-
-
In return, he agreed to testify against the other three participants. 
James Lockett was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed his conviction because he had 
been denied discovery materials to which he was entitled. After 
a retrial that ended in a hung jury, a second retrial produced a 
conviction and death sentence which currently is on appeal to 
the Ohio Supreme Court. Dew was tried and convicted next, but 
he was not sentenced to death because the trial judge found that 
he was mentally retarded and that his offense "was primarily 
the product of the offender's ••• mental deficiency" within 
the meaning of one of Ohio's "mitigating circumstances." 
Petitioner, who rejected a prosecution offer to plead 
guilty to aggravated murder without specifications, was convicted 
and sentenced to death. 
B. The Ohio Supreme Court's construction of felony-murder 
and aiding and abetting in this~- Petitioner was tried and 
convicted as an aider and abettor to Ohio's version of felony-murder. 
The felony-murder statute, §2903.0l(B), provides: 
"No person shall purposely cause the death of another 
while corrnnitting or attempting to corrnnit, or while fleeing 
irrnnediately after corrnnitting or attemr.ting to corrnnit ••• 
aggravated robbery or robbery •••• ' 
The aider and abettor statute, §2923.03, provides: 
"(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability 
required for the corrnnission of an offense, Shall do any of 
the following: ••• 
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On appeal, petitioner contended that she had not been proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under these statutes for two 
reasons. First, the State did not prove that the principal, 
Parker, "purposely" caused Cohen's death. Second, even if the 
State had proven that, it did not prove that petitioner was guilty 
as an aider or abettor because it did not show that she acted 
"with the kind of culpability required for the connnission of 
an offense" - i.e., that she had a purpose to kill Cohen. The 
Ohio Supreme Court rejected both arguments. 
First, the State had shown that Parker acted with a "purpose" 
to kill under Ohio law: 
"It is well established in Ohio that 11rl(*one may be 
presumed to intend results which are the natural, reasonable, 
and ?robable consequences of his voluntary act***' [cite], 
and ***if the use of a weapon, likely to produce death 
or serious bodily harm, results in death, such use ••• may 
justify a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
was an intent to kill.' [cite] 
" ••• All the participants were aware that an 
inherently dangerous i nstrumentality was to be employed to 
accomplish [the robbery]. The murder of the proprietor was 
a natural and probable consequence of the execution of a 
connnon plan, which, in itself, was inherently dangerous to 
human life. The record contains sufficient evidence upon 
which a jury could find a purposeful intent to kill ••• " 
App. 206. And by a parity of reasoning, the State also had shown 
that petitioner herself had a "purpose" to kill: 
"The record establishes that the appellant participated 
in the planning and commission of the robbery and acquiesced 
in the use of a deadly weapon to accomplish the robbery. Under 
these circumstances, it might be reasonably expected by ·all 
the participants that the victim's life would be endangered 
by the manner and means of performing the act conspired. 
"Therefore, the appellant ••• is bound by all the 
consequences naturally and probably arising from the 
furtherance of the conspiracy to connnit the robbery. The 
-
- -
record reflects that this was the case and establishes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had a 
purposeful intent to kill." 
App. 208. 
Three judges on the seven-judge court dissented. They 
argued that under the majority's construction, any accomplice 
to an armed robbery "is automatically liable for aggravated 
murder with specifications and for the death penalty, regardless 
of whether he or she had any actual intent to kill, whenever 
one of the participants in the robbery kills someone." App. 215. 
As I read the opinion, the dissenters would hold that the 
death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to an accomplice 
who is not shown to have had an actual intent to kill - as 
- distinguished from the majority's holding that a "purpose to 
kill" may be presumed from a person's participation in an offense 
in which "it may be reasonably expected that the victim's life 
would be in danger." The dissent concluded: 
-
"A conclusive judicial presumption that one person 
had the specific intent to conunit murder, because his 
confederate had such intent, necessarily will result in 
some accomplices to aggravated robbery receiving the 
statutory punishment for aggravated robbery, while others, 
for the same acts, will be sentenced to death because of 
the acts and purposes · of others. The imposition of the 
death penalty in the latter cases is both arbitrary and 
grossly disproportionate to the crime. 
"I would hold that a trial court in a capital case 
under the present statute may not constitutionally presume 
that an accomplice shares a principal offender's purpose 
to kill, and would hold that the fact must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, under all the circumstances, in 






A. Petitioner. Petitioner contends that the death penalty 
is grossly disproport ionate and inconsistent with contemporary 
standards of decency as applied to a defendant "who is merely 
a minor participant in a felony-murder situation, where the 
underlying felony involved no design to kill and where the 
defendant took no part in the acts which actually caused the 
felony-murder victim ' s death." Brief for Petitioner 61-62. 
There are a number of strings to her bow. 
First, Gregg v. Georgia held that the death penalty is 
not unconstitutionally disproportionate "when a life has been 
taken deliberately by the offender ••• " 428 U.S., at 187 
- (emph. added). This careful language suggests that the case 
might be different where a killing was not "deliberate" or 
committed "by the offender." Similarly limited langauge is found 
in Coker v. Georgia, where the Court described Gregg as holding 
"that the death penalty for deliberate murder was neither the 
purposeless imposition of · severe punishment nor a punishment 
grossly disproportionate to the crime." 97 S.Ct., at 2866 (emph. 
added). 
Second, it would be grossly disproportionate to sentence 
petitioner to death, because her "individual culpability" is 
no greater than that of any other aider and abettor to an armed 
robbery. She has been singled out from all such aiders and 
abettors to die, solely because of the intent and actions of 




It is grossly unfair that petitioner should be condemned to die 
be cause of Ieasons beyond her control or desire, while others 
whose participation in armed robberies was exactly the same as 
hers are allowed to live. 
Third, Ohio is the only State that does not consider a 
defendant's "minor participation" in an offense to be at least 
a mitigating factor in the imposition of sentence. "Of the 
jurisdictions which now have death penalty statutes, six would 
preclude petitioner's execution outright; sixteen others specify 
that a minor degree of participation must be considered as a 
factor in the life-of-death sentencing decision; and the 
remaining nine allow consideration of any mitigating factor. 
- Not a single state has followed Ohio .in excluding minor 
participation as a mitigating factor." Brief for Petitioner 
64-65 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, very few participants in 
felony-murders who did not commit the act causing death have 
been sentenced to death, and even fewer actually have been 
executed. Id., at 65-66. In short, it is the judgment of 
contemporary society that such persons should not be sentenced 
to death. 
Finally, imposition of the death penalty in a case like 
this cannot further a significant deterrence goal. It makes 
no sense to punish a person more severly because of the acts of 
another. 
I 
B. The State. The State replies that "It is legally impossible -
- -
- for a 'minor' participant in a felony murder to become a 
death penalty candidate because there is the requirement of 
a purposeful killing in order to be convicted of Aggravated 
1/ 
Murder." Brief for ,- Resp. 28 .- And there is no difference 
between the culpability of petitioner and of Parker, for both 
Were found to have the same "purpose to kill." It would be 
untenable to creat a per~ rule that aiders and abettors cannot 
be sentenced to death, for that would "prom<llte[] smart criminals 
duping dumb criminals into being the triggerman." The law long 
has recognized that aiders and abettors may justly be punished 
in manner 
/the same/as their principals. Finally, the State has a strong 
interest in deterring conduct that is likely to cause death. 
- For this reason, there is ample justification for holding 
that all persons who agree to participate in an armed robbery 




Neither side grapples with the hard problems in this case. 
I agree with petitioner that a death sentence seems greatly 
out of proportion to her own culpability and participation in 
this offense. I also am impressed with her claim that Ohio 
is the only State that does not allow minor participation at least 
--- ~ ,,_,,_,___ ____ __.......,_,,,.....,,-,,_, ~ 
to count as- a mitigatingf actor." -
Jo 
-
1. The State quotes a slew of jury instructions in this case 
to the effect that a "person acts purposely when it is f speci f i c ~k;s 
intention to cause a certain result," while convenienty ignoring 
other instructions in this case to the effect that the jury could 
infer a purpose to kill from the fact of an armed robbery. Compare 
Brief for Respondent 28-29, with App. 214 (dissent in Ohio Supreme 
Court, quoting jury instructions). 
-
- - II 
On the other hand, as I will discuss below, it is quite 
difficult to formulate a bright-line principle for sorting out 
-------- ·--'=-, ,,,_,, "-------- - - - -which participants in killings should be liable to the death 
penalty and which should not. In addition, any such sor t ing 
very likely would cut against the grain of the felony-murder and 
aiding-and-abetting doctrines which have become pretty well 
established in the criminal law. Rather than trying to formulate 
r-
a general principle, then, the best way to handle this case 
might be simply to require that the sentencing authority always 
must take into account the degree of the offender's participation 
in the offense. 
A. The difficulty of formulating~ principle. I have spent 
}-
- some time trying to decide why it seems wrong to me that this 
petitioner should be sentenced to death. One possible principle 
-
to explain this reaction would be that a person who does not have 
an actual intent to kill, or an actual intent that another person 
connnit a killing, should not be subject to the death penalty. This 
idea may lie behind the pointed references in Gregg and Coker 
to the permissibility of the death penalty for deliberate murder. 
This principle would preclude the State from executing 
petitioner, because it seems clear enough that she was convicted 
without a finding that she actually intended for Parker to kill 
Cohen. The difficulty with this principle is that it also would 
preclude the execution of a person like Parker himself, who 






actually intended to kill - that is, the so-called "triggerman" 
in a felony-murder. This result might be unobjectionable, 
perhaps even desirable, as an a priori matter. But I think it 
would be inconsistent with this Court's affirmance of the death 
sentence in Gregg. 
The joint opinion in Gregg states quite clearly that, "The 
trial judge submitted the murder charges to the jury on both 
felony-murder and nonfelony-murder theories." 428 U.S., at 




"would be authorized to [convict of felony-murder] whether the 
cl,.. defendant intended to kill the deceased or not. A homicide, 
~ lthough unintended, if connnitted by the accused at the time of 
• ~ me other felony constitutes murder." 428 U.S., at 216 n.4 (White, 
J., concurring in judgment). Because the jury returned a general 
verdict of guilty on the murder counts in Gregg, it is conceivable 
that it convicted without finding that Gregg actually intended to 
kill. 
(The affirmance in Gregg on the basis of this general 
verdict seems inconsistent to me with the emphasis in that opinion 
on deliberate murder. On the facts of Gregg, it seems quite likely 
that the killings actually were deliberate. Is it possible that - '"" the Court overlooked the fact that the case was submitted to the 
jury both on murder and on felony-murder theories?) 
A second possible principle to explain this case would be 
that a person who does not actually commit the act that causes 
- death cannot be sentenced to death. This principle would allow 
- -
- the execution of Gregg and Parker for felony-murder, but would 
preclude execution of petitioner. But this principle would be 
difficult to defend in cases where a person who did not actually 
commit the act that caused death nevertheless actually intended 
that another person commit the killing. The most obvious example 
of such a person is the employer in a murder for hire. Another 
example would be presented if petitioner and her confederates 
-
had agreed beforehand that Parker would kill Cohen. In these 
cases, death may not be a disproportionate penalty, even for 
those whose own acts do not cause the death. 
A third possible principle would be that a person who did 
not himself commit the act that caused death, and who did not 
actually intend that another would commit a killing, cannot be 
sentenced to death. This principle, too, would preclude the 
execution of petitioner while allowing execution of Parker and 
Gregg. It also would allow the employer in the murder-for-hire 
case and similar cases to be sentenced to death. Finally, it 
describes petitioner's own case rather precisely. My only 
problem with this principle is that I am not sure whether it 
is fair to Parker. 
Suppose, for example, that Parker's story that the gun went 
off when Cohen grabbed for it is true. If Parker did not mean 
13 
-
to kill any more than petitioner meant for him to kill, why should 
Parker be ltable to receive a death sentence while petitioner is 
not? Parker's own culpability might arguably be greater simply 
because he carried the gun and petitioner did not; but if he and 
-
• -
petitioner both agreed that they would commit an armed robbery 
and that he would carry a gun, and if neither meant for him 
to use the gun, is the fact that he carried the gun so important 
as to make Parker liable to the death penalty while petitioner 
is not? 
I am not sure what my answer would be. Part of the problem 
goes back to the feeling that one who does not intend to kill 
may not be a suitable candidate for a death sentence; but the 
affirmance in Gregg seems to suggest that this is not a proper 
ground for treating Parker and petitioner alike. 
B. Alternatives to~ bright-line principle. As the above 
discussion indicates, I am uncertain whether this case and cases 
- like it lend themselves to solution via general principles. ~ 
alternative which I would find attractive would be to require that 
the sentencing authority at least take into account in mitigation 
-
- ------ w -- -the fact that a defendant's own participa~ion in an offense was 
as an accomplice and that his intent may not have been to kill . -------- - ----This solution would be consistent with the prior cases in this 
Court, for I think that these factors could be considered under 
the statutes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. The solution also 
would avoid calling into question the laws in those states where 
the fact that a person was only an accomplice may be considered 
in mitigation) but where there is no absolute preclusion of the 
death sentence for persons who were only accomplices or who did 




In addition, this solution would dovetail nicely with a 
reversal in Bell, if Bell were to hold that the Ohio statute 
is toonarrow because the sentencing authority cannot take into 
account the defendant's youth as a mitigating factor. Here, 
the Court could hold that the Ohio statute is too narrow because 
it does not allow the sentencing authority to take into account 
only 
the fact that petitioner was/an accomplice to a felony-murder 
as a mitigating factor. 
The problem with this solution is that the Court would 
not declare, as a matter of substantive Eighth Amendment law, 
that this petitioner simply cannot be executed for her part in 
this offense. Although it is difficult to find a principle to 
- explain why that should be so, I still cannot help but wonder 
whether execution ✓of this.petitioner would be a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. As I said at the beginning of this memo, 
-
I am undecided whether it would be better to hold that Lockett 
simply cannot be executed, or to hold that she cannot be 
only 
executed under a statute where the fact that she was/an 
aider and abettor to a felony-murder does not at least count 
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IV. SANDRA LOCKETT. 
Apart from the question whether a defendant's minor participation 
in an offense should be a factor that the sentenc~ng authority 
~•so 
must take into account in mitigation, petitionerJraises the same 
argument as Bell, to the effect that Ohio's mitigating factors 
generally are too narrow. Here, as in my Bell memo, I set 
forth the relevant information about Sandra Lockett herself. 
Lockett was 21 years 8 months old at the time of the offense. 
suspension 
She had a history of truancy and occasional / from school. 
She dropped out of the tenth grade at age 16 to get married, 
and was 6 months pregnant at the time. Her husband left her 
then 
not long after her baby was born, and Lockett/worked steadily 
at the Chrysl er plant in Akron for a period described variously 
as two or four years, before bei ng fired for excessive 
absenteeism. While she worked at Chrysler, she also attended 
a business college. 
An IQ test administered after trial showed a score of 81 to 
87. When she was in the fourth grade, school IQ tests showed 
a score of 107, but two years later she scored 76 on the same test. 
The record indicates that she got Bs and Cs in school. 
While a juvenile, Lockett was arrested twice for shoplifting 
and once for forging another person's welfare check. While an 
adult, she was convicted of petit larceny and resisting an officer; 
she also was arrested for assault and battery and grand larceny, 





At the time of the offense Lockett was unemployed, 
on welfare, and living with her parents. She had been 
"snorting" -not injecting - heroin for about six months, but 
at the time of the offense ghe was attending a drug clinic, 
taking methadone treatments instead of heroin, and was 
believed by clinic personnel to be making good progress. 
The various post-trial psychiatric reports agree 
that Lockett does not suffer from a psychosis or mental 
deficiency. She is portrayed as a cheerful person who 
is not at home with abstract concepts, and who mainly wants 
to please ,other people. One of the reports concluded: 
"Sandra's contention that she did not participate in 
a plan to murder anyone is very supportable. Her 
per sonality structure not only is unlikely to result 
in unnecessary anger or violence, but is in fact 
oriented against acting out or hurting •••• 
"Finally, if she is to be returned to society, ~ 
her prognosis for rehabilitation is very favorable." . 
(App. 152.) 
POSTCRIPT: I have made a point of talking with the 
clerks in the Stewart and Stevens chambers about the Bell and 
Lockett cases. Although what I have given you in these two 
memos represents just my own thinking, I believe that they 
have some of the same problems and reach about the same 
conclusions. Given the divisions on the Court over capital 
punishment, it obviously would be good for the law if you, 
Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens could continue the 
useful process of cooperation that resulted in the Gregg set 






opposed to their clerks'), I have some hope that your and 
their views might be close enough to avoid further 
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January 19, 1978 
No. 76-6513 Bell v. Ohio 
No. 76-6997 Lockett v. Ohio 
~ 
1~_.to'i11 
I dictate this summary memorandum of my tentative 
views in preparation for tomorrow's Conference: 
We took these cases to consider whether the Ohio 
statute, as construed, allows the sentencing court 
sufficient authority to consider all relevant mitigating 
factors. 
The Ohio statute, unique among those we have 
considered, specifies only three categories of mitigating 
circumstances, those arguably relevant to these two cases 
being limited to "duress", and "psychosis or mental 
deficiency". The statute is structured in a curious way. 
It provides that the sentencing authority may consider "the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, 
character, and condition of the offender" but only if these 
circumstances establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the offense was committed under duress or was the 
product of the defendant's "phycosis or mental 
deficiency". 
In the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Bell (48 
Ohio St. 2d 270), that court held that: 
- -
2. 
"Syllabus 2. Relevant factors such as the age of 
the defendant and prior criminal record are among 
those to be considered by the trial judge or 
three-judge panel in determining whether the 
existence of a mitigating circumstance pursuant 
to R.C. 2929.04 (B} (2) and (3) was established by 
a preponderance of the evidence, State v. Bell, 
48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E. 2d 556 (1976)-.-(Br. 
23} • 
The foregoing makes clear that age and prior 
criminal record may be considered (in these cases} only "in 
determining whether the offense was committed under duress, 
or whether the offense was the product of defendant's 
'psychosis or mental deficiency'". 
And in State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, at 96, 
"mental deficiency" is defined solely in terms of a 
"defective state of intelligence" or "subnormal 
intelligence (i.e., in terms of one's I.Q.)". 
Despite the foregoing, there are a number of 
statements in opinions of the Ohio court to the effectthat 
the mitigating factor language should be construed broadly. 
If the statutory language did not determine "life 
or death" for the defendant, perhaps we could tolerate the 
ambiguity of the statutory language as construed. But 
where the death sentence is at issue, I cannot conclude 
that the sentencing court was required to focus on all 
relevant mitigating circumstances. 
In Bell, this would include primarily the 
defendant's age (not quite 17}, the environment of his 
- -
youth, his addiction to drugs, and the possibility of 
rehabilitation due to the fact that his intelligence 
actually was relatively high. Moreover, there was no 
finding that he was the "trigger man", though he certainly 
was heavily implicated in the murder. 
In Lockett, it is even less clear that the 
sentencing authority was required to consider the 
circumstances under which the offense was committed, 
including the relatively secondary role she played in a 
murder she probable did not foresee. 
3. 
In each of our prior cases, Gregg, Proffitt, 
Jurek and Harry Roberts, we mentioned as possible 
mitigating factors {i) age, {ii) extent and nature of prior 
criminal record, and {iii) emotional or mental 
disturbance. In Proffitt we also specifically mentioned 
the degree of participation in the offense. 
If, as I am disposed to vote, the Court concludes 
that these two cases must be reversed, the more troublesome 
question for me is the proper disposition. We could simply 
hold, I suppose, that the mitigating factors relied upon by 
these two defendants could not have been considered 
adequately under the Ohio statute, and order that the death 
sentences be set aside. The advantage of a limited holding 
is that the entire statute would not be invalidated, with 
the result that every Ohio death sentence under this 
- -
statute would be set aside. The statute is facially valid 
with respect to a defendant who, for example, can advance 
no mitigating circumstances at all: ~-~-, an adult, sane, 
murderer for hire. 
4. 
The alternative to working out a "narrow" decision 
(which I suspect would be difficult), is simply to 
invalidate the Ohio statute for its failure adequately to 
require consideration of all relevant mitigating 
circumstances. I will not join any per se rule either as 
to age or accomplices ("non trigger persons"). None of our 
cases has suggested a per se rule. Rather, although our 
language has varied, they can be read as supporting the 
appropriateness - indeed constitutional necessity - of at 
least affording the clear opportunity to the sentencing 
authority to consider all relevant mitigating factors. 
I attach to this memorandum a brief summary of the 
relevant portions of the statutes in Gregg, Proffitt and 
Jurek. Although Jurek is far from being a model, the Texas 




Georgia statute (Gregg) 
Bifurcated. 
-
Ten specified aggravating circumstances. 
Sentencing judge or jury directed to "consider any 
mitigating circumstances" - without identifying any 
particular ones. J~~~~ 
In Gregg we said the statute requires the j-a-1=-5/ or 
jury "to consider the circumstances of the crime and the 
criminal before it recommends a sentence". (Specifically 
mentioned "youth of accused". 428 U.S. 197.) 
Florida statute (Proffitt) 
Bifurcated. 
Both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 
specified in statute. 
The specified mitigating ones include: (a) prior 
record, (b) mental or emotional disturbance, (c) accomplice 
and participation in crime 'fl relatively minor, (d) age 
(and several others). 
Note: Under this statute Lockett may well have 
been spared the death sentence. 
Texas statute (Jurek) 
Bifurcated. 
Does not specify either aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, but listed three broad questions that related 
- -
ii. 
to (1) intent of defendant and circumstances of crime, (2) 
probability of future criminal conduct, and (3) presence of 
provocation. 
Death sentence could be imposed only if answers to 
all of these questions are adverse to defendant. 
Texas court construed these requirements broadly -
to include age and prior criminal record, as well as other 
circumstances. 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim Alt 
~ 
January 19, 1978 
Re: Your memo of tentative views in Bell v. Ohio and 
Lockett v. Ohio. --
) 
As you know, I am in agreement with your view that the 
"mitigating factors" that may be considered under the Ohio 
statute are too narrow, and that both Bell and Lockett were 
prejudiced by this defect. I would like to comment on two 
other points raised by your memo: first , the possibility of 
erecting some kind of per se rule in Lockett's case; and second, 
the proper disposition of these cases, assuming reversal. 
1.I think that the only kind of viable per~ rule that 
4t Lockett's case might produce would be one along these lines: 
-
"No person may be sentenced to death unless the finder of fact 
determines that he actually intended to kill, or actually 
intended that another kill." This rule would be consistent with 
Gregg's holding that the death penalty is not unconstitutional 
as applied to deliberate killings. It also would preclude the 
execution of Lockett, because the finder of fact only determined 
:e: 
that she participated in a scheme that carried the for;eeable 
possibility that someone might be hurt or killed. 
This rule also would preclude execution of the "triggerman" 
actually 
in a felony-murder, unless the fact finder determined that he/ 
intended to kill. If Parker had been tried, and if his jury 
had been instructed the same way Lockett's was, it would preclude 
.... . ........ - - 2. 
- his execution. Of course, the rule also would preclude execution 
of a person convicted of felony-murder in a jurisdiction 
-
-
that (unlike Ohio) follows the "strict" version of the 
felony-murder rule: i.e., that a person is guilty of felony-murder 
if a killing takes place during a felony, whether or not the 
killing was foreseeable or intended. 
There may be some sympathy for adopting this kind of 
rule at tomorrow's Conference. There also may be those who 
believe that a rule requiring "actual intent" can be limited 
.t o non-triggermen in felony-murders, so that triggermen still 
might be executed. I believe the latter position would be 
untenable, because I have difficulty in distinguishing between 
the culpability of a triggerman and a non-triggerman where neither 
intended to kill . 
In any event, if some variation on this kind of rule is 
proposed, I would argue that it is unnecessary to decide the 
issue in these cases. Bell and Lockett, at the least, should 
~
have their death sentences set aside. It will be time enough 
to decide whether a person who did not intend to kill may 
be executed when the case comes here under an otherwise valid 
statute. 
2. I agree that the proper disposition of these cases 
presents a tough problem . If the Court adopts the narrow 
approach of setting aside just Bell and Lockett's sentences, 
someone - the Ohio courts? - will have to decide which other 
defendants also should have the benefit of the ruling. This 
~ 
t' .. . • ~ 
-
-
- - 3. 
would produce rather protracted proceedings and, in some cases, 
may require holding further hearings. (Further hearings would 
be necessary for those defendants who claimed that they did 
not present evidence in mitigation that was available to them 
because it was not relevant under Ohio law.) In addition, 
if the Court holds that the sentencing authority must consider 
all evidence in mitigation as opposed to listing particular 
factors that must be considered (age, prior record, etc.) 
virtually every defendant would have some claim that he was 
prejudiced by the narrowness of Ohio's mitigating factors. 
In view of these problems, my own inclination would be 
then 
y 
to hold the Ohio statute invalid on its face, and set aside all ~ 
- _ ___....., _ _-a I 
sentences under it. This conclusion is influenced by my guess 
that the Court will not want to get into the business of listing 
particular factors that must be considered in mitigation, so that 
the narrowness of the statute here probably did prejudice 
virtually every defendant to some extent. 
One o~her .possibility would be: to remand these cases, and 
all the other Ohio cases, for new sentencing· he,21,rings that would 
take into account all required mitigating factors. I do not 
think this is a viable alternative, for it would require the 
Court to construe the Ohio statute as taking into account a 
broader range of factors than the Ohio Supreme Court has said 
it takes into account. I also do not think this Court should 
remand the cases to the Ohio Supreme Court to decide whether it 
- wants to "reconstrue" its statute; for it already had the chance 
to do that, and refused to. 
JA 
~ 
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~2 ~ nell v. Ohio, 76-6513 
Lockett 6>'6-&997 
It seems to me that the Court should decide the 
mitigation issue in these cases with a formulation 
approxima ti ng the following : 
"The sentencing authority mu st be allowed to 
consider all mitigat ing circumstances in a 
meaningfu l fashion ." 
Since I think it i · inescapable tha t, although Ohio 's 
statute refers to "the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history , character , and condition of the 
offende r," it does no t allow !:Dcan ingful consideration of 
the d,:?fcndant 's age , degree of culpabil ity, or prior 
record , to pick three factors , I think the death sentence s 
must be vacated. 
There ar e severa l reason s wh y I think this approach 
is preferable to an e n ume ration of certain spec ific 
mitigating circumstanc~s (e.g., ag e , culpability, e tc. ) 
which are a const ilutiona l minimu m. First , it is mor e 
consisten t with the language in prior cases such as Jurek 
and Harr_y_ RS?_bert s, which refer to consid2ration of "all" 
relevant circumstances . Second, I think it would be very 
ctifficult for the Court to come up with s uch a list and 
agr.c2 11pon it.), 'Third , a11 y ~.1.1c h list v:ould a l mos t 
i nvariab ly mi ss some c2se s in whic h there wo uld be an ) 
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unusual r eason why we f e el t h e de a th sente~ce s hould not 
, - . 
be irc:pws .:: d . . :. Finally, it sec::, s '.::o D 2 tl:.at 
- - -
t ~: e ; ::ip l i c i t 
j urisprud e ntial basis for such a "laundry list" could only 
b e a feeling that in some cases the presence of one o r 
more of the enumerated factors would make the imposition 
o f the death penaJty on that person crue l and unusua l pe r 
s e , a decision I am not sure the Court is prepared t o mak e . 
There are severa l possible ob j ections t o my 
formulatio n . The mos t substantia l i s that it reintroduce s 
uncontr o lled j ur y discretion . Tha t argument , I th i n k , is 
foreclosed by Gregg v. Georgia , where the jur y was allowe d 
t o conside r any mi t ig at i ng circumstance . Moreover , t he 
extent to whic h Kurma n ' s emphasis o n uncontrolle d 
d i scretion is s till th e governing pr i nc iple i n this are a 
is uncle ar t o me . F i na lly , reading Greg g , J ure k, 
?roffit t , e t a l . , l0av 0 s me with the definite impression 
tha t ihe Cour t ' s concern with discretion is a one-way 
matte r . I n Fu rma n t he jury wa s giv e n u n c o nt r ol led 
discretion to choose from a wide variety of offenders 
which wil l receive the death penalty . This vice has bee n 
cured in the acceptab l e statute s by t he specifi c 
a ggr a vating (actors which a jury must find . But Gregg 
make s it ver y clea r tha t the presence of some discretion 
t o impose me~cy does not make the death penalty crue l and 
unusual . This ma y be difficult to comprehend analytically 




o ne c a n say th a t a jury is muc h mo re likely t o randomly 
c ond emn bla c k s t han it is t o randomly spar e whites . 
Second, one can argue that this ov e rrules Proffitt 
sub silentio , since in that case there were enumerated 
mitigating ci r c ums t a nces . However , the Court noted that 
the mitigating circumstances unde r Florida's statute were 
not exc1usive. I s h o uld me ntion , however, that a number 
of recent cert p e tns from Flo rida have claimed tha t in 
fact the enumerated mitigating circumstances have been 
considered as ex clusive ; Florida ' s statute might thus 
have to be r e considered . 
Finally, one can object that this prevents a state 
f rom aJopti ng a n " answe r one question" approach and 
requires instead tha t it adopt a balancing of aggravation 
and mitig a tion . I don't think so . In ~urek , Texas 
r e quir e d the j ur y t o answe r t h re e ques tions, one of which 
~as whethe r the deft was likely to commit violent crimes 
in the future . A no answer precluded imposition of the 
do~th penalty. But t his question allowed consideration of 
all r elevant mitigati ng f a ctors , according to this Court. 
Fo llow i ng ~ur0 ~, I t hi n k a Sta te can c h anne l tne 
sentenci ng au thority's c on sidera tio n of mitig a ting 
circumsta nces towards a n sweri ng c e rtain questions ; wha t 
it canno t d o is exc1t'<l e ne,in i .1g(u l c onsid e r a tion of some 
mitiga ting ci r c ums t ance s, a s Ohio has done . In addition , 
I s ho uld point out that an extensive laundry list could , 
- -
in practice cc~;el the adoption of a balancing test ; a 
c Late '"1 • - ' i · 1 " • • • th · , ~ , t d ,__,L ''--'- 'j' ,.: ~,''2 -'-.L noc ~-:2rn: co sa y · . ac no uer:enoan un-er a 
certain age can eve r be executed , s o t hat a balancing 
wou ld in effect be required . 
I think it is i mportan t that this case be decided 
broadly enough t o give guidance to the States . (For that 
reaso n I think the othe r issues in the case - - jury trial , 
the Ja~~~o n issue , etc . -- should also be decided ) Thu s, 
I do not think it would be sufficien t me rely t o decide 
that "at a min imum , ag e and culpability mus t be 
considered ." Tha t invites fut ure litigation . I think a 
broad principle shou ld be established, and tha t it should 
be the one I have se t forth . 
rl 
. . 
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(DRAFT] 
Re: No. 76-6997, Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief, 
I have read your memorandum in this case with much 
interest. Let me say at the outset that I join John in expressing 
gratitude for your leadership in seeking to develop a Court 
opinion. Secondly, I also join him in agreeing with the basic 
conclusion expressed in the final paragraph on page 17 of your 
memorandum, and I would hope that a Court opinion could be 
written reaching that conclusion on the basis of our recent cases. 
In my view, an opinion reaching this conclusion should 
be based not on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but squarely on the Eighth Amendment (as incorporated 
in the Fourteenth), for at least three reasons. First, the 
parties did not brief and argue this issue as a Due Process 
question, but as one involving only the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Second, the recent decisions of the Court that 
impel you, albeit reluctantly, to the conclusion you express on 
- -
- 2 -
on page 17 were based exclusively on the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, not on the Due Process Clause. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly from a practical standpoint, a decision 
based upon Due Process would call into question the constitutional 
validity of literally thousands of sentences imposed upon convict-
ed defendants throughout the country, and would surely lead to 
countless habeas corpus petitions attacking t~ose convictions. By 
contrast, a decision based upon the Eighth Amendment could be 
and should be confined to death sentences. 
My recollection is that at our Conference discussion we 
agreed that the opinion in this case (or in Bell v. Ohio) should 
dispose of every constitutional attack made upon the Ohio statute 
in both cases, in order to preclude extended future litigation. 
I think this decision was wise, and in the best interests of Ohio, 
and ourselves, not to mention those on death row in that state. 
My recollection is that a majority wrote that the other constitu-
tional attacks were without merit, with the exception of a re- . 
quirement on the State Supreme Court to give careful compara-
tive review to the facts in each case relied upon for the imposition 
of the death sentence. 
- -
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I sincerely hope that your laudable effort to develop a 
Court opinion in this case will be successful, and assure you 
of my continuing cooperation to achieve this end. 
Sincerely yours, 
PS/hd 
- -~npu me QJltltrl of f4t 'Jit.uiith- .;§bdts-
J)'ag-~n. ~- QJ. 2!1,;rJ-l..;l 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUST ICE J O H N PAUL S T EVENS 
April 12, 1978 
Re: 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
Not only do I agree with your analysis of 
the position that the Court has in fact reached; 
I also found your review of the State statutes 
most enlightening and persuasive. Of greatest 
importance, I applaud your leadership in seeking 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-
..§upi-tml' {!Jllttrt it£ tqc ~ttitcb ;§mug 
'lllru;frhtgtcn. ~. QJ. 2llffe>l~ 
January 23. 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 7 6- 6997, Lockett v. Ohio 
I vote to reverse. I continue to adhere to my view. 
expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314, Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, and Coker v. Georgia, 45 U.S. L. W. 
4961, 4966, that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.:§u.pumt {qltltrl llf tqt 'Jlltti:tt~ ~ taftg 
'J.i'aglrittghl~ J. {q. 2!lffe~, 
April 10, 1978 
Re: 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
~ -1~(/ 
I took this assignment only for a memorandum of a proposed 
disposition. The period of gestation has been long and perhaps 
the whole business should have the "Roe-Doe" Remedy, but here 
it is. 
We granted certiorari in this case to consider, among 
other questions, whether Ohio violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by sentencing Lockett to death, pursuant 
to a statute that limited the sentencing judge's discretion to 
consider the special circumstances of Lockett's crime as 
mitigating factors. 
My initial reaction was to aff i rm the sentence. I 
continue to adhere to the view, expressed in my Furman dissent, 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits resort to "cruel and 
unusual" punishment, only in that it forbids traditional 
cruelty. The imposition of punishment grossly disproportionate 
to the severity of the crime, such as that of 17th and 18th 
century England, may well fall under the Eighth Amendment. But 
I do not think that the Eighth Amendment requires any 
particular sentencing procedure. 
~'I ... 
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Approaching the case from that position, the only question 
for me was whether Lockett's punishment was grossly 
disproportionate to the crime that she committed. Despite my 
personal views on the death sentence generally and my belief 
that its use is dubious in this case, I was reluctant to 
interfere with the judgment of the Ohio legislature on the 
matter. My reluctance was reinforced by the fact that most 
states have traditionally provided that accomplices like 
Lockett, whether they be principals in the second degree or 
accessories before the fact under the common law, should be 
prosecuted, tried and sentenced as if they had actually 
committed the crime. Lockett knew that her cohort would be 
armed. And I had difficulty seeing a principled basis for 
preventing Ohio from holding her accountable for the use of 
such firearm when she was aware of the artifice for acquiring 
it from the victim. 
Nevertheless, after further reflection I have decided to 
propose a solution with the hope that we could resolve this 
case with a Court opinion. To do this, I accept much of what --was said by the pluralities of Furman and the 1976 death ---penalty cases in their present confused state, although the 
rationale of those pluralities is binding on no one and 
although I think it unsound. The two and three-member 
pluralities in Furman, Gregg, and Woodson focused on the 
?~ 
sentencing processes in those cases to be certain that they 
were in accord with "civilized standards," Woodson, 428 
-3--U.S., at 288, quoting from Trop v. Dulle ~ 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958), and did not create a substantial risk that the death 
penalty will be inflicted in an "arbitrary and capricious 
manner." Gregg, 428 U.S., at 188. (Hugo would plaintively ask 
where in the Constitution are those words "civilized 
standards?")'!:..../ 
From that starting point, I have concluded that our 
holdings, taken together, strongly argue, even if they do not 
require, that the death penalty not be imposed upon one who is ---------convicted as an accomplice without at least permitting the 
sentencer to consider the relative degree of the accomplice's 
-------~ 
involvement in the crime as a mitigating factor. (I refrain ------from saying "comparative culpability," for the law reviews 
would at once say "a new doctrine" has emerged.) I have 
further concluded that the sentencing procedure in this case 
fails to conform to the present state of our holdings (dubious 
as I regard them) because it prevents adequate consideration of 
the relative degree of an accomplice's participation. 
I . 
The practice of permitting sentencers considerable 
discretion to weigh individual mitigating factors was well 
established and accepted in this country long prior to Furman, 
see,~-, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199-203 & n. 
11 (1971); Woodson, at 295-298. But there was no clear 
evidence regarding the essential scope of that discretion in 
capital cases until Furman and the judgment in Woodson and 
*/ Hugo, I am sure, would vote with all of us to strike 
down ~apital punishment for "shoplifting" -- or even stealing 
the Mona Lisa. 
~ 
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Roberts forced the states to attempt to provide specifically 
for the consideration of mitigating factors in the capital 
sentencing process. In response, the states and the federal 
government enacted the death penalty statutes currently in 
effect. (That we first compelled them to travel down the 
"mandatory" road and then reneged, is irrelevant now.) With 
few exceptions, these statutes either require or permit the -- -
7 
sentencer to assess an accomplice's culpability by considering 
"'---- -the degree of his involvement in the crime. They indicate 
'-- "- -------
that, under the concepts of "civilized standards" we decreed, . 
the degree of an accomplice's involvement in a capital crime is 
a factor relevant to culpability. I do not see how that factor 
can be excluded from consideration in sentencing an accomplice. 
Four states and the United States now consider a finding 
of relatively minor involvement on the part of an accomplice is 
sufficient to prevent a death sentence altogether. In most 
capital crimes, 1 / California permits the death penalty only 
if the defendant was personally present during the actual 
commission of the act causing death, and directly committed or 
physically aided in the commission of the act. Cal. Penal Code 
§ 190.5(b) (1977). 
l/ Under Cal. Penal Code§ 190.5(b) and 190.3(i) as 
amended by stats 1977 c. 316. Sen Bill 155 effective Aug. 11, 
1977, it appears that an accomplice to the crimes of murder for 
money pursuant to an agreement, treason, or perjury in a 
capital case can receive the death penalty, but even in cases 
involving those crimes the sentencer may consider a number of 
mitigating factors ihcluding th~ degree of the ~ccomplice's 
participation. 
- -5- -
Similarly Maryland's newly enacted death penalty statute 
does not permit the death sentence unless the defendant was a 
principal in the first degree or unless the defendant employed 
another to commit murder for remuneration. Md. Sen. Bill No. 
374 enacted March 10, 1978, Section 413 (D) and (E). Colorado, 
Connecticut, and the United States do not permit a death 
sentence in any case if the defendant was only an accomplice 
and his participation in the crime was relatively minor. 
Twenty states specify that a relatively minor degree of 
participation on the part of an accomplice is a mitigating 
factor that may or must be considered in determining whether to 
impose the death penalty. 
Four states, Georgia, Delaware, Idaho and Oklahoma have 
not attempted to catalog specific mitigating factors, but they 
permit the sentencer to consider any relevant mitigating factor -
in determining whether the dealth penalty should be imposed in 
a particular case. Mitigating factors are relevant to capital 
sentencing in Texas only to the extent that they indicate 
whether or not there is "a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society." Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 
37. 071 (b) (2) (Supp. 1975-1976). But the sentencer is 
apparently free to consider whether the degree of an 
accomplice's involvement renders him less culpable than the one 
who actually commits the offense and thus less likely to commit 
acts of violence in the future. Virginia does not include the 
1r> 
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degree of an accomplice's participation in its list of 
mitigating factors, but it permits the sentencer to consider 
any relevant factor in addition to those specifically 
listed.~/ This, obviously is the safe course for states to 
follow. 
Of the current death penalty statutes only those of Ohio; 
Pennsylvania, New York and Rhode Island clearly fail at least 
to permit consideration of whether the degree of an 
accomplice's involvement in a crime reduces his culpability as 
far as imposing the death sentence is concerned. The New York 
and Rhode Island statutes apply only to murders by prisoners 
under a life sentence and by prison escapees. They are not 
particularly relevant to this case for it is unclear whether - -----
those states impose the dealth penalty upon an accessory who is 
not serving a life sentence. And the Court has not treated 
statutes dealing with inmates serving a life sentence on the 
same basis as other death penalty statutes. See Woodson, at 
287, nt. 7, 292, nt. 25. 
One may reasonably argue that the current state statutes 
are poor indicators of evolving standards of decency because of 
their recent vintage. Most of the statutes referred to above 
were adopted after Furman. Many of them were adopted 
~/ The following states also permit consideration of 
any relevant factor: Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah and Washington. 
? 
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in response to the plurality opinions in the 1976 death penalty 
cases. 
But that argument does not apply in this case. The 
concept of permitting sentencers to consider the relative 
degree of an accomplice's involvement before imposing the death 
penalty is consistent with the traditional sentencing practic~s 
in this country. Prior to Furman most state criminal codes, as 
they do now, provided that various categories of accomplices, 
including those in capital cases, should be charged, tried and 
sentenced as if they had actually committed the crime 
directly. But at the same time each state that retained the 
death penalty permitted the sentencer discretion to consider 
any relevant factor before imposing a death sentence. See 
Woodson, at 291-92 (1976); McGautha, at 200 n. 11 (1971). 
Sentencers were free to consider the relative degree of an 
accomplice's involvement as a mitigating factor. The existence 
of sentencing discretion in capital cases evidenced a 
recognition of the near impossibility of defining crimes so as 
to isolate, with the degree of precision necessary in those 
cases, the acts and offenders deserving the death penalty. See 
McGautha, at 198-99; Furman, at 402 (CJ dissenting). Up to 
McGautha, this Court had greeted discretionary sentencing as a 
"humanizing development." See reference in Furman, at 402 (CJ 
dissenting). 
In 1971, in McGautha v. California, supra, the Court held 
that nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause 
prevented the practice. Quoting from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
- -8- -
391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court said that "one of the most 
important functions any jury can perform [in capital 
sentencing] is to maintain a link between contemporary 
community values and the penal system -- a link without which 
the determination of punishment could hardly reflect the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." McGautha, at 202. Thus, the Court 
indicated that discretion regarding sentences in capital cases 
tends to ensure that the determination of punishment reflects 
evolving societal standards of decency. The Court further 
indicated that the states were entitled to assume that juries 
would consider the appropriate factors in exercising "the truly 
awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human." 
Id., at 208. 
After the plurality in Furman announced that the death 
penalty statutes then in existence violated the Eighth 
Amendment because the discretionary sentencing led to the 
imposition of the death sentence "wantonly" and "freakishly", 
Furman, at 309-10, and provided no "meaningful basis for 
distingu i shing the few cases in which it was imposed from the 
many cases in which it was not", Furman, ~ra, at 309, the 
( 
states that desired to retain the death penalty were obliged to 
revise their statutes. Despite the massive confusion as to the 7 
implications of Furman's plurality holding, 11 states adopted 
death penalty statutes that continued to permit sentencing 
discretion with respect to consideration of mitigating 
- -9- -
factors. Five of the new statutes specifically listed the 
degree of an accomplice's participation as a factor to be 
considered. Now that the Court has further "backtracked" on 7 
-------- -- rl 
Furman's holding to make it clear that mandatory death 
penalties are prohibited rather than preferred, as Furman's 
plurality seemed to say, the fact that the current death 
penalty statutes, with few exceptions, either require or permit 
consideration of the relative degree of an accomplice's 
involvement, reflects the importance of that factor in the 
sentencing process according to current "civilized standards". 
It is unlikely that Ohio or any other state would have 
precluded consideration of the relative degree of an 
accomplice's participation in a capitai offense had it not been 
for the opacity of Furman and the consequent misunderstanding 
about the evils of discretion. 
In view of the fact that 17 states initially responded to >/ 
' Furman by enacting mandatory death penalties applicable to 
accomplices regardless of their degree of involvement, one 
might argue that there is no clear social norm commanding that r 
a sentencer be permitted to consider relative degrees of 
involvement piior to imposing a death sentence. But the 
post-Furman mandatory death penalty statutes do not, in my 
' 
opinion, prevent the conclusion that the sentencer must be 
) 
permitted to~eigh the relative degrees of the defendant's 
involvement. In theory, Bill Rehnquist was correct in his 




asserting that the mandatory statutes show a number of states 
do not consider it contrary to societal standards to impose the 
death penalty without considering individual mitigating 
factors. Woodson, at 313. But as Potter, Lewis and John 
pointed out in their Woodson opinion, at 297-299, the mandatory 
statutes show in reality only a desire for "some form of 
capital punishment," id., at 299 n. 35, and a willingness to do 
whatever was necessary to maintain the death penalty and comply 
with the confusing commands of Furman. Id., at 298. 
Just as Furman's ambiguity appears to have been 
responsible for the aberrant resort to mandatory death 
penalties by 17 states, there is reason to believe that Furman 
may have led Ohio to limit drastically the sentencer's 
discretion to consider individual mitigating factors. Prior to 
Furman, Ohio permitted the sentencer complete freedom to 
consider any mitigating circumstances relevant in a particular 
capital case. Ohio's system of unbridled jury discretion 
survived constitutional attack and received a measure of 
approval in Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), which was 
decided in the same opinion with McGautha. But Ohio was in the 
process of reshaping its death penalty statute when McGautha 
was announced. See Lehman and Norris, Some Legislative History 
and Comments on Ohio's New Criminal Code, 23 Clev. St.~ Rev. 
8, 9, 16 (1974). A little more than a year later, when Furman 
was announced, the Ohio House of Representatives had already 
passed a bill that permitted the sentencer discretion regarding 
- -11- -the imposition of the death penalty and required that certain 
mitigating factors be considered. See Sub. H.B. 511, 109 Ohio 
General Assembly§ 2929.03 passed by the Ohio House on March 22 
(1972}; Lehman and Norris, supra, at 10, 18. The bill as 
passed by the Ohio House required the sentencer to consider any 
"circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though failing 
to establish a defense." Sub. H. B. 511, supra. § 
2929.03 (c} (3). 
Under the Ohio House Bill, the sentencing judge in this 
case clearly would have been free to consider the relative 
degree of Lockett's involvement, as well as all of the other 
mitigating circumstances in this case and it can be seriously 
doubted that she would have been sentenced to death. 
Furman was announced during the Ohio Senate Judiciary 
Committee's consideration of the Ohio House Bill. After 
Furman, the Committee decided to retain the death penalty but 
to eliminate much of the sentencing discretion permitted by the 
House Bill. As a result, the Ohio Senate developed the current 
Ohio sentencing procedure which does not permit the sentencer 
to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Confronted 
with what reasonably would have appeared to be the questionable 
constitutionality of permitting discretionary weighing of 
mitigating factors in the period between Furman and Gregg, the 
sponsors of the Ohio House Bill were not in a position to mount 
a strong opposition to the Senate's amendments. See Lehman and 
Norris, at 19-22. 
~ 
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In view of Ohio's longstanding practice of permitting 
unrestricted sentencing discretion regarding the death penalty 
and the lack of any restriction on consideration of mitigating 
factors in the bill that had been passed by the Ohio House 
prior to Furman, it is reasonable to believe that the Ohio 
legislature withdrew sentencing discretion in capital cases 
because it be l ieved that Furman compelled that course of action. 
The established pre-Furman practice of permitting 
unrestrained discretion to consider mitigating factors in 
capital cases and the approach adopted by the current death 
penalty statutes afford a basis for concludin~ that "civilized 
standards" of sentencing in this country -- given the present 
somewhat ambiguous state of the law -- require that the 
sentencer be permitted to consider the degree of an 
accomplice's involvement. 
In view of the context in which they were enacted, neither 
Ohio's death penalty statute nor any of the other post-Furman 
pre-Woodson statutes that severely limit the consideration of 
mitigating factors convinces me otherwise. 
There is nothing new in a concept of considering the 
degree of the defendant's culpability in sentencing. In 
pursuit of that chimera of individualized sentencing, a great 
deal of fuzziness has evolved in the whole area of criminal 
sentences. Anyone who has attended a sentencing seminar has 
heard judges give a wide range of explanations for what they 
thought "tailored" sentencing meant. Nevertheless, one common 
- -13- -denominator stands out. Judges in sentencing have taken into 
account the differences in the degree of participation. The 
driver of the get-away car might well be given a lesser 
sentence than the robbers who entered a bank and robbed the 
institution at pistol point, threatening if not inflicting 
injury on victims. Indeed, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 
247-50 (1949), stands for the proposition, along with other 
cases, that a sentencing judge may take into account an 
infinite range of considerations in sentencing generally and 
deciding between the imposition of a life sentence and capital 
punishment. 
/ 
The heart of the matter is this: Up to now we have not 
/ said this was constitutionally compelled but only that it was 
{) constitutionally permitted. 
r 
The question before us now is whether a state may define 
its capital offenses and structure its capital sentencing 
process in a manner that prevents any distinction in 
culpability based on the degree of involvement. Our conclusion 
should, I think, be that even though an accomplice may be tried 
and convicted of a capital offense as though he were tpe 
primary actor, the severity of his offense and hence possible 
punishment, relates to the degree of his involvement in the -crime. And a state must not be allowed to prevent the -sentencer, in a capital case, from assessing an accomplice's 
culpability by considering the degree of his involvement. 
II. 
Once it is established that the relative or comparative 
degree of an accomplice's involvement in a crime is a critical 
- -14- -
consideration in determining whether the death penalty should 
be imposed, the application of the net consequence of Furman, 
Gregg, and Woodson to this case becomes a relatively simple ~-V 
matter. It is no longer a matter of whether each of us fully 
agrees; two plus three equals five and I am prepared to abide 
that combination. (I am not a card player but I am told there 
is something compelling about 3 Aces and two Kings!) 
The current Ohio death penalty statute imposes the death --penalty for aggravated murder if at least one of seven specific 
aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt and 
it is not established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
(1) The victim of the offense induced or 
facilitated it. 
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have 
been committed, but for the fact that the 
offender was under duress, coercion or strong 
provocation. or 
(3) The offense was primarily the product of 
the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, 
though such condition is insufficient to 
establish the defense of insanity. 
The sentencer is instructed to consider the "nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and 
condition of the offender" in determining whether one of the 
three mitigating circumstances exist. But factors such as the 
defendant's age, prior record, prospects for rehabilitation, 
- -15- -and character may be considered only if relevant to the 
existence or non-existence of the three mitigating factors. 
Ohio's complicity statute contains the familiar clause 
---------------that one who, with the culpability required to make out the 
offense, aids and abets in, or conspires to commit, an offense 
is to be prosecuted as if he actually committed the offense. 
And, under Ohio law as established by the Ohio Supreme Court in 
this case, an aider and abettor in a crime is presumed to 
intend any death which was reasonably likely to occur and does 
occur in the course of the offense. 
But the degree ("comparative culpability"} of an 
accomplice's involvement in a crime is not ~a mitigating 
I 
factor. If it is clear that the victim did not induce or 
facilitate the crime, that the defendant did not act under 
duress, coercion or strong provocation, and that the 
(y'MA!, 
defendant's participation in the offense was not primarily the 
product of psychosis or mental deficiency, it matters not, 
under the statute that the defendant may, for example, be a 
youthful, first offender with good prospects for 
rehabilitation, or an accomplice who played a relatively minor 
role in the crime. The death sentence must be imposed even if 
the sentencer considers that person significantly less culpable 
than the primary actor -- the "triggerman". 
Ohio's statute -- enacted in the fog of Furman -- makes no 
attempt to account for the obvious differences in culpability 




the store and kill the owner and one who knew that the robber 
had a gun and simply agreed to drive the get-away car. 
Lockett, as we know, was convicted as an aider and abettor 
to a killing that occurred in the course of a robbery of a 
pawnshop while she awaited in the car outside. The sentencing 
judge was not permitted to give any consideration to the 
relative degree of her involvement in the crime once he 
determined that she did not fall within one of the statute's 
mitigation factors, none of which measure relative involvement. 
Under the circumstances, the approach of the plurality in/ 
Woodson leads to the conclusion that Lockett was sentenced in ~ 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. · 
Were we on a clean slate, I would still leave most of 
these refinements to the states. But we are not and our 
obligation now is to try to make clear what has not been clear -during the past six years of evolution. To me, this justifies 
a holding based on the 1976 cases -- Woodson, et al. I 
continue to resist the idea that the Eighth Amendment requires 
any particular sentencing process, and I would prefer to modify 
the plurality approach and base a decision on Fourteenth 
Amendment due process, primarily, with an assist from the 
Eigh~h Amendment. 
I would be willing to go one step further than Woodson, et 
al., and hold that it violates Fourteenth Amendment due process 
for a state to sentence a person to death pursuant to 
definitions of crimes and sentencing procedures that do not 
- -17- -
permit consideration of the relative culpabil i ty of individual 
crimes and offenders, thus creating a substantial risk that the 
sentence imposed will be significantly disproportionate to the 
crime. 
The prevailing standards in this country -- long used by 
judges in non-capital cases -- indicate that the degree of an-
accomplice's involvement should not be excluded from sentencing 
consideration in a capital case. Because Ohio fails to permit 
consideration of that factor in its guilt determining or 
sentencing process, I am prepared to hold that the procedure 
under which Lockett was sentenced created an unacceptable risk 
of a disproportionate sentence and thus failed to give her the 
due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The essence of the position I find we are in is that a 
state may not affirmatively exclude consideration of relevant 
mitigating factors -- in short that the safe future route for a --------
state to clear the constitutional hurdles we have set up, is to 
adopt a catch-all clause allowing consideration of "any other 
relevant factors." The Woodson plurality said almost the same 
things; it needs the legitimatizing balm of five votes. 
Regards, 
P.S. I have toyed with the idea of suggesting a remand to 
the Ohio Supreme Court so that it could consider whether Ohio's 
~ - -18- -death penalty statute can be construed to permit the sentencer 
to weigh the mitigating factors such as age and degree of 
involvement even if none of the three mitigating factors 
specified in the statute are established. I drawback, however, 
because in State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 87 n. 2 (1976), 
the Ohio Supreme Court specifically said that the Ohio statute, 
unlike the one approved in Proffit, does not permit 
consideration of age, prior criminal record, or of the fact 
that the defendant was an accomplice with only a minor role in 
the crime. And the Ohio Supreme Court relied on its Bayless 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim Alt 
Re: The Chief 
( ~ett v. 
/~ 
April 13, 1978 
-~ 
Memo to the Conference in No: 76-6997, 
~ ave these three points to make about the Chief's memo: 
I. It is not clear to me whether the Chief proposes only 
to hold that a State must allow the sentencing authority to 
"consider the relative degree of the accomplice's involvement 
in the crime as a mitigating factor," Memo at 3; see also id., at 
4-9, 13 or whether he proposes the broader holding that "a 
state may not affirmatively exclude consideration of relevant 
mitigating factors." Id., at 17; see also id., at 15 , 18 . 
This seems to me to be a distinction of some importance. 
If the Chief proposes to hold that the- Ohio statute is 
bad because it does not allow consideration of one particular 
mitigating factor, then the Court will have to start down the 
road of deciding which mitigating factors the Constitution requires 
to be considered, and which it dmes not. I do not think the Court 
should take this approach, because it surely would find itself 
facing "an endless stream of defendants claiming that factors or 
circumstances peculiar to them should have been, but were not, 
weighed in their favor." Bench Memo in No. 76-6513-, Bell v. Ohio, 
at 31. 
If, however, the Chief proposes to hold that the State must 
allow the sentencing authority to consider any mitigating factors 




holding would have much to commend it: 
(a) It would be consistent with the holdings in the prior 
capital cases. In each statute the Court has upheld, the list 
2. 
of mitigating factors has been "open-ended." The only arguable 
exception is the Florida statute upheld in Proffitt, which lists 
eight aggravating circumstances and seven mitigating circumstances. 
But even there, as the joint opinion pointed out, "the capital-
sentencing statute explicitly provides that '[a]ggravating 
circumstances shall be l:i:mited to the following [eight specified 
factors.]. [cite] There is no such limiting language introducing the 
list of statutory mitigating factors." 428 U.S., at 250 n.8. 
In addition, there is language in some of the cases to support 
the notion that the sentencing authority must be allowed to 
consider whatever mitigating factors may be present.~., "it 
is essential that the capital sentencing decision allow for considera-
tion of whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to either 
the particular offender or the particular offense." Harry Roberts, 
No. 76-5206, Slip Op. at 4. 
(b) The Chief's clerk working on this case has reviewed all 
of the capital-punishment statutes now in force, and he reports 
that most of them have open-ended lists of mitigating factors. 
-----------... -
At most, 10 states' laws have what appear to be closed-ended 
lists, and these are open to contrary construction by the state 
courts. Thus, if the Court were to mandate that the sentencing 
authority must be able to consider all relevant mitigating 





of a great number of statutes. 
(c) The approach would be preferable either to deciding 
which particular mitigating circumstances must be considered, or 
to holdif\g that no particular mitigating circumstances must be 
considered. Basically, I think this approach makes good sense. 
(d) One possible criticism of this approach is that it is 
inconsistent with the notion that the sentencing authority must 
(._ disc.re{-io"-'.) 
be given guidance and channelling in the exercise of itsJrn&~ 
It could be argued that an open-ended list of mitigating circumstances 
invites the sentencing authority to consider or 
whatever mitigating factors it chooses, and to 
however it chooses. 
disregard 
weight them 
I think there are two answers to this point. First, the 
~
Court already has upheld statutes containing open-ended lists of 
mitigating circumstances, most clearly in Gregg. Second, the 
presence of statutorily-defined aggravating circumstances, together 
with careful instructions to focus on the offense and the offender 
in deciding whether mitigating circumstances are present, anJ 
perhaps a requirement of specific findings that 
mitigating circumstances are or are not present, all should serve 
to channel discretion effectively. 
In short, if the Chief is proposing to hold that the sentencing 
authori~ ust be allowed to consider any mitigating circumstances 
to which the defendant can point, I would join him. I have 
received signals from his chambers suggesting that the Chief should 
be pinned down on which of the two approaches mentioned above is 
y 
- 4. -
the one he really means to propose. Perhaps it would be best to 
send him a note saying, "As I read your memo, you propose ...,...--
an open-ended approach. I agree." 
II. It is unfortunate that the Chief wants to rely on the 
\)yv \\ Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on 
Eighth Amendment, as you, Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens f the 
·7 
have done in the prior cases. I see no distinction between what 
is to be held here, and what was held in Gregg and the other 
cases, that could justify this switch in emphasis. In addition, 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971~ rejected the notion 
that the Due Process Clause requires sentencing discretion to be 
channelled by standards in capital cases, As you will recall, 
the joint opinion in Gregg had to do a neat sidestep around this 
holding as it came down on the Eighth Amendment grounds. See 
428 U.S., at 195-196 n. 47. Although it might not be 
necessary for the Chief to overrule McGautha, it seems to me that 
unnecessarily 
he would add/to the confusion surrounding the doctrinal suppo~ 
for that case and the Gregg line of cases. 
I gather that the Chief has something of an obsession over 
the "expansion" of the Eighth Amendment that was worked by the 
joint opinion in Gregg. My impression is that he is offering to 
acquiesce in the substantive constitutional development in 
capital-punishment law that was made there, if the members of the 
joint opinion will admit that they went under the wrong 
amendmP.nt. From your own standpoint, I see no reason to make such 
an admission. From the standpoint of the Court and the law, however, 
. . ~ - - 5 . 
if the Chief could get five votes to join the same opinion in these 
cases, it would be a happy development . For this reason, 
continued 
I would suggest that you ex press a/preference for keeping the 
analysis under the Eighth Amendment, but not close out the 
possiblity that the Due Process Clause also is relevant . It might 
be possible to horse-tr&de on particular language once an opinion 
is circulated . 
III. The Chief does not say what disposri.tion he would make -
in Lockett, Bell, and the other pending Ohio cases. Since he has 
concluded that the Ohio courts should not get another shot at 
"construing" their statute, see Memo at 17-18 (I agree), 
he apparently . does not contemplate remands for new sentencing 
hearings, at least under this statute. 
Thus, there appear to be three options for disposition open: 
First, the Court could G V & R to determine whether 
particular defendants could have shown any mitigating circumstances, 
and thus were harmed by the statute's unconstitutionality . I 
would oppose this approach. It has not been taken in the 
other mandatory-sentence cases4 Moreover, i t would make little 
sense to me to hold such hearings in all these cases so long 
after many of these trials . I doubt whether the issue could be 
decided on existing records, since defendants may not have tried 
to present evidence of some mitigating factors in view of the 
narrowness of the statutory factors . 
Second, the Court could leave open the pos s ibility that 
these defendants might be sentenced to death once again if Ohio 
• > - - 6. -
enacts a new, constitutional sentencing statute. I doubt whether 
this approach would survive an ex post facto objection. And 
once again, the Court did not take this route in the other 
mandatory-sentence cases. 
Third, the Court could GV & R with the contemolation that 
all death sentences would be corrnnuted to life in prison. This is 
the approach that I would take . It is consistent with that 
followed in prior cases, and it seems the most fair and economical 
way of handling the problem. 
JA 
; - -.§upr.rntt QJettrl of iltt 'Jlfufub ~taf.tg 
'Jl!f a5 qingLnt, ~ . <!}. 2llffe '1-.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART / 
April 13, 1978 
Re: No. 76-6997, Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief, 
I have read your memorandum in this case with much 
interest. Let me say at the outset that I join John in express-
ing gratitude for your leadership in seeking to develop a Court 
opinion. Secondly, I also join him in agreeing with the basic 
conclusion expressed in the final paragraph on page 17 of your 
memorandum, and I would hope that a Court opinion could be 
written reaching that conclusion on the basis of our recent 
cases. 
In my view, an opinion reaching this conclusion should 
be based not on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but squarely on the Eighth Amendment (as incor-
porated in the Fourteenth), for at least three reasons. First, 
the parties did not brief and argue this issue as a Due Process 
question, but as one involving only the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Second, the recent decisions of the Court that 
impel you, albeit reluctantly, to the conclusion you express 
were based exclusively on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, not on the Due Process Clause. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly from a practical standpoint, a decision based 
upon Due Process would call into question the constitutional 
validity of literally thousands of sentences imposed upon con-
victed defendants throughout the country, and would surely 
lead to countless habeas corpus petitions attacking those con-
victions . By contrast, a decision based upon the Eighth 
Amendment could be and should be confined to death sentences. 
1· - -
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My recollection is that at our Conference discussion we 
agreed that the opinion in this case (or in Bell v. Ohio) should 
dispose of every constitutional attack made upon the Ohio statute 
in both cases, in order to preclude extended future litigation. 
I think this decision was wise, and in the best interests of Ohio 
and ourselves, not to mention those on death row in that state. 
My recollection is that .a majority thought that these other consti-
tutional attacks were without merit , with the exception of a re-
quirement on the state Supreme Court to give careful compara-
tive review to the facts in each case relied upon for the imposi-
tion of the death sentence. 
I sincerely hope that your laudable effort to develop a 
Court opinion in this case will be successful, and assure you of 
my continuing cooperation to achieve this end. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
,// ~ 
' • / l 
\/ 
CHAMBE RS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
- -
j;u:µuntt {!Jttttrl af flrt '2!Inifrh j;f ttlt g 
._rullpttghm. ~- <!J. 21Tgi'!,? 
April 14, 1978 
Re: No. 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
✓ 
In all probability I will not join your opinion in this 
case, and you are accordingly entitled to discount the following 
observation. I agree entirely with Potter that any implications 
of your opinion which would have any spillover outside of the area 
of death sentences would be disastrous, and if you agree with 
him that such a spillover is a possibility that you consider 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- . - --- . ---··--- v. Ohio 
Dear Chjef: 
I join Potter and John in saying that your 
memorandum is constructive, and the summary of the 
situation is quite interesting. 
The conclusion you reach in the final paragraph of 
your memorandum is, as you suggest, in accord with the 
Woodson plurality, and also what was said in Harry_B9perts: 
"It is essential that the capital sentencing 
decjsion allow for consideration of whatever 
mitigating circumstances may be relevant to either 
the particular offender or the particular offense." 
No. 76-5206, slip op. at 4. 
I therefore wholJy concur in your conclusion. 
As to the proper analytical framework, I agree 
~ith Potter that we should remain with the Eighth Amendment 
analysis. I am not at all sure where the due process 
clause might lead us. 
You have not yet addressed the other issues raised 
in the Ohio cases. I share Potter's recollection that at 
least a majority of us thought it best to dispose of all of 
them. In my view none is meritorious. 
Sincerely 
lfp/ss 
f. - -.:§u-p-r tmt <!}mt.ti o-f tfyt ~ttitth ~taltg 
'J_taglp:ttgfon. ~- <!}. 2llffe.ll-~ 
CHAMBE RS OF / 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Apri117, 1978 
Re: No. 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with others that your memorandum of April 10 
is helpful and that it promises to take the Court down the road 
to a Court opinion in the Ohio capital punishment cases. The 
memorandum is particularly helpful, I feel, because it outlines 
rather dramatically the difficulties that have beset the Court in 
its death penalty decisions of recent years and focuses upon the 
pendulum swings that have taken place. It discloses the corner 
into which the Court painted the States and reveals the causes 
for the mandatory statutes (which some of us predicted) and now 
the swing back to the discretionary with all its ramifications. 
I suspect tl?-at, like Bill Rehnquist, I shall not be able 
to join the opinion that evolves. Having said that, however, I ~ 
presume to say that (1) I prefer the Eighth Amendment rather 
than the Due Process approach, and (2) that the Court should 
dispose of all challenges raised. I share the feeling that others 
have expressed that most of these are without merit. 
More specifically, my position at conference was that a 
sentencing authority must be permitted to consider the degree of 
a non-triggerman's involvement. It would follow that the Ohio 
statute was unconstitutional as applied to Sandra Lockett on that 
fairly narrow ground. When I first read your opinion, I thought 
that this would be its thrust, as revealed by the language on 
page 12 and some on pages 13-14. At ·the end of your opinion, 
however, I sense a shift to the plurality position in Woodson, 
namely, that to be constitutional a capital sentencing statute 






rehabilitation, and character. Language on pages 14-15 and 17 
seem.5 to read to this effect. For me, the point of taking a non-
triggerman case was that there might be some broader agreement 
on the necessity of considering the factor distinctive to non-
triggermen, namely, the degree of involvement. Those in the 
Woodson plurality might well wish to write beyond an opinion so 
confined, but I would have thought that they at least could join 
such an opinion as a basic proposition. 
Sinc/tiJ . 
.... 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
- e. 
April 29, _1978 
No. 76-6997 Lockett v. Ohio 
No. 76-6513 Bell v. Ohio~ 
Dear Chief: 
In your memorandum of yesterday, you ad.vised thEt 
assignments wilJ be deferred uniil you have all votes in 
the four ceses mentioned: ~ J 
~ 
I hcve today written you sepa.rate),y in 77-747 
(Fleck), casting a vote to reverse. 
As to the two Ohio c,pital ccses (Bell end 
Lockett) I believe I have voted to the extent possible on 
the basis of wh ,t h cs been ci rcul ?.ted. In my Jetter to 
you of April 14, I expressed my concurrence wjth your 
proposed resolution of the pr~ncipal i.ssue i.n these cEses, 
assuming that the anal.ytical framework remains the Eighth 
Amendment., I also stated th z,t I view none of the other 
issues as ,meritorioug. ~ 
~ 
As to Bakke, my view remain as previously 
stated. I wouJd affirm as to Bakke himself and an 
inflexib]'e quota system, but would reverse th ct part of 
the Cetifornia Court's judgment that forbids a state 
university from considering race as one factor to be 
weighed, competitively, along with other relevant factors 
in making admission decisons. 




CHAMBE RS O F 
THE CH I EF" JUSTICE 
- -
j;lt.Jtttmt C!fourl .of t~t ~~ j;tattg 
~agfyinghtn., g}. <!}. 2!Jffe-'!,~ To : 
June 9, 1978 
\ f'" ~ .... 
l 1J...!.. • 
From: The Chi ef 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 76~6997 Lockett v. 
~1-/J 
The process of trying to shape a disposition- of 
this case (and Bell) that will reconcile the varying views 
and command a Court has proven more of a task than I 
anticipated when I sent my sanguine memo of April 10. 
Absent a Court in support of something along the 
enclosed lines, I have concluded that a terse Per Curiam 
reversing is in order _with the less said the better except 
that all factors tendered in mitigation be considered as 
has been the practice in non-capital cases. 
The problem with this enterprise is that converting 
a sound practice into a constitutional command is something 
for which I have small taste. 




~ ~) ~4 .. ~ 




.. - Re: 76-6997 - Lockett v. hio 4/f 
We granted certiorari in this case to consider, among other 
~ 
questions, whether Ohio violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by sentencing Sandra Lockett to death pursuant to a 
statute that narrowly limited the sentencer's discretion to 
consider the circumstances of the crime and the record and 
character of the offender as mitigating factors. 
I. 
Lockett was charged with aggravated murder with the 
specifications (1) that the murder was committed for the 
purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or 
punishment for aggravated robbery, and (2) that the murder was 
committed while committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing 
immediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated 
robbery. That offense was punishable by death in Ohio. See 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03 (1975 Repl. Vol.). She was also 
charged with aggravated robbery. The case against her depended 
largely upon the testimony of a co-participant, one Al Parker, 
who gave the following account of Lockett's participation in 
the robbery and murder. 
• - -2- -
Lockett became acquainted with Parker and Nathan Earl Dew 
while she and a friend, Joanne Baxter, were in New Jersey. 
Parker and Dew then accompanied Lockett, Baxter, and Lockett's 
brother back to their home in Akron, Ohio. After they arrived 
in Akron, Parker and Dew needed money for the trip back to New 
Jersey. Dew suggested that he pawn his ring. Lockett 
overheard his suggestion, asserted that the ring was too 
beautiful to pawn, and said that they could get some money by 
robbing a couple of places. Later that day, Lockett suggested 
a local grocery store and a furniture store as targets. She 
warned that the grocery store's operator was a "big guy" and 
carried a "45" and that they would have "to get him real 
quic k ." She also vo l unteered to get a gun from her father's 
basement. But by that time, the two stores had closed and it 
was too late to carry out the plan to rob them. 
Someone, apparently Lockett's brother, suggested a plan for 
robbing a pawn shop. He proposed that he and Dew enter the 
shop and pretend to pawn a ring. Parker, who had some bullets, 
would then enter the shop, ask to see a gun, load it, and use 
-3-
• it to rob the l op. There was no plan to. ill anyone. Lockett 
was not to be among those entering the pawn shop because she 
knew the owner. She guided the others to the shop that night. 
The next day Parker, Dew, Lockett, and her brother gathered 
at Baxter's apartment. Lockett's brother asked if they were 
"still going to do it." Everyone, including Lockett, agreed to 
proceed. The four then drove by the pawn shop several times 
and parked the car. Lockett's brother and Dew entered the 
shop. Parker then left the car and told Lockett to start it 
again in two minutes. The robbery proceeded according to plan, 
but the pawnbroker grabbed the gun when Parker announced the 
"stickup." The gun went off with Parker's finger on the 
trigger and fired a fatal shot into the pawnbroker. 
Parker went bac k to the car where Lockett waited with the 
engine running. While driving away from the robbery, Parker 
told Lockett what had happened. She put the gun from the 
pawnshop into her purse. Lockett and Parker left their car and 
got into a taxicab. Soon after this the police stopped the 
cab, but Lockett had placed the gun under the front seat. 
.. - -4- -
Lockett told the police that Parker rented a room from her • 
mother and lived with her family. The police called Lockett's 
parents for verification and then released Lockett and Parker. 
Lockett hid Dew and Parker in the attic at the Lockett home 
when the police arrived at the Lockett household later that 
evening. 
Parker was apprehended and charged with aggravated murder 
with specifications, an offense punishable by death, and 
aggravated robbery. Prior to trial he pleaded guilty to 
aggravated murder and agreed to testify against Lockett, Dew, 
and Lockett's brother. In return, the prosecutor dropped the 
aggravated robbery charge and the specifications to the murder 
charge, thereby el iminating the possibility that Parker could 
receive the death penalty. 
Lockett's brother and Dew were later convicted of 
aggravated murder with specifications. Lockett's brother was 
sentenced to death, but Dew was not because it was determined 
that his offense was "primarily the product of mental 
deficiency," one of the three mitigating circumstances 
recognized by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04 (B} (3). 
- -5- -
Two weeks before Lockett's separate trial, the prosecutor 
offered to permit her to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter 
and aggravated robbery (offenses which each carried a maximum 
penalty of 25 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, see Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.03, 2911.01, 2929.11 (1975 Repl. Vol.), 
if she would cooperate with the state. She rejected the 
offer. Just prior to her trial, the prosecutor offered to 
permit her to plead guilty to aggravated murder without 
specifications, an offense carrying a mandatory life penalty, 
with the understanding that the aggravated robbery charge and 
an outstanding forgery charge would be dismissed. Again she 
rejected the prosecutor's offer. 
At trial, Lockett's defense counsel's opening argument 
summarized what appears to have been Lockett's version of the 
events leading to the killing. He asserted the evidence would 
show that, as far as Lockett knew, Dew and her brother had 
planned to pawn Dew's ring for $100 to obtain money for the 
trip back to New Jersey. Lockett had not waited in the car 
during the robbery but had gone to a restaurant for lunch and 
- -6- -
had joined Parker, thinking the ring had been pawned, after she 
saw him walking back to his car. He asserted that the evidence 
would show further that Parker had placed the gun under the 
seat in the taxicab and that Lockett had voluntarily gone to 
the police station when she had heard that the police were 
looking for the pawnbroker's killers. Unfortunately, the 
defense was not able to prove the facts outlined in the opening 
statement to the jury. 
Parker was the state's first witness. He related his 
version of the robbery and shooting. He admitted to a prior 
criminal record of breaking and entering, larceny, and 
receiving stolen goods. He also admitted that he had jumped 
bond and had never served the sentence. He acknowledged that 
his plea to aggravated murder had eliminated the possiblity of 
the death penalty, and that he had agreed to testify against 
Lockett, her brother, and Dew as part of his plea agreement 
with the prosecutor. 
At the end of the major portion of Parker's testimony, the 
prosecutor renewed his offer to permit Lockett to plead guilty 
- -7- -
to aggravated murder without specifications and to drop the 
other charges against her. Lockett again refused the offer. 
In the course of the defense presentation, Lockett's 
counsel informed the court, in the presence of the jury, that 
he believed Lockett was to be the next witness and requested a 
short recess. After the recess, Lockett's counsel informed the 
judge that Lockett wished to testify but had decided to accept 
her mother's advice to remain silent, despite her counsel's 
warning that she would have no defense except the 
cross-examination of the state's witnesses if she remained 
silent. 
The Court instructed the jury that, before it could find 
Lockett guilty, it had to find that she had purposely killed 
the pawnbroker while committing or attempting to commit 
aggravated robbery. But it also told them that one who 
"purposely aids, helps, associates himself or 
herself with another for the purpose of 
committing a crime is regarded as if he or she 
were the principal offender and is just as guilty 
as if the person performed every act constituting 
the offense •... " 
Regarding the int- requirement, the court - tructed: 
"[A] person engaged in a common design with others to 
rob by force and violence an individual or individuals 
of their property is presumed to acquiesce in whatever 
may reasonably be necessary to accomplish the object of 
their enterprise. 
"If the conspired robbery and the manner of its 
accomplishment would be reasonably likely to produce 
death, each plotter is equally guilty with the 
principal offender as an aider and abettor in the 
homocide •..• An intent to kill by an aider and 
abettor may be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt 
under such circumstances." 
The jury found Lockett guilty as charged. 
Once a verdict of aggravated murder with specifications had been 
returned, the Ohio death penalty statute required the trial judge to 
impose a death sentence unless, after "considering the nature and 
circumstances of the offense'' and Lockett's "history, character, and 
condition," he found by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the 
victim h ad induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely 
that Lockett would have committed the offense but for the fact that 
she "was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation," or (3) the 
offense was "primarily the product of [Lockett's] psychosis or 
mental deficiency." Ohio Rev. Code§ 2929.03-.04(b) (1975) Repl. 
Vol). 
In accord with the Ohio statute, the trial judge requested a 
pre-sentence report as well as psychiatric and psychological 
reports. The reports contained detailed information about 
Lockett's intelligence, character, and background. The 
psychiatric and psychological reports described her as a 
21 year old with low average or average intelligence, and not 
suffering from- mental deficiency. One . the psychologists 
reported that "her prognosis for rehabilitation" if returned to 
society was favorable. The presentence report showed that 
Lockett had committed no major offenses although she had a 
record of several minor ones as a juvenile and two minor 
offenses as an adult. It also showed that she had once used 
heroin but was receiving treatment at a drug abuse clinic and 
seemed to be "on the road to success" as far as her drug 
problem was concerned. It concluded that Lockett suffered no 
psychosis and was not mentally deficient. 
After considering the reports and hearing argument on the 
penalty issue, the trial judge concluded that the offense had 
not been primarily the product of psychosis or mental 
deficiency. Without specifically addressing the other two 
statutory mitigating factors, the judge said that he had "no 
alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not" but to impose 
the death penalty. He then sentenced Lockett to death. 
/ 
- II. -
Lockett raises several issues regarding the 
constitutionality of the statute under which she was 
sentenced. At the outset, we address three of her contentions 
which have no merit and do not require extended discussion. 
A. 
She contends that the statute violated her Sixth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it permitted no jury 
participation in the sentencing process. But, as noted in 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976), "it has never 
been suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally -------
, .., 
required." And Lockett has presented no basis for holding that 
the Sixth or Eighth Amendments require jury sentencing in 
capital cases. Indeed, "it would appear that judicial 
sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater 
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of 
capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in 
sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose 
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases." Id. 
, , 
- B. -
Lockett also argues that the Ohio rule permitting the trial 
judge to grant mercy upon a guilty plea and the statutory 
procedure for sentencing defendants who waive a jury trial 
impermissibly penalize the right to plead not guilty and 
request a jury trial. 
The Ohio death penalty statute requires that the death 
penalty be imposed once a defendant is convicted of aggravated 
murder and at least one of seven 
~t..C• 4~'--' ~ 
aggravating e:pso irtcat1ens 
,1· 
J 
unless one or more of three mitigating factors are found to 
exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 2929. 03 (C) (E), 2929. 04 (197 5 Repl Vol.) • When a defendant 
pleads guilty or no contest to a charge of aggravated murder 
with specifications, however, Rule ll(C) (3) of the Ohio Rules { 
of Criminal Procedure permits the trial judge to dismiss the 
specifications and impose a life sentence, according to the 
"interests of justice." A defendant who requests a jury trial 
is sentenced by the trial judge but a defendant who waives his 
right to a jury trial is tried and 
sentenced by a. anel of three judges who . • t unanimously agree 
that none of the mitigating factors exist before the death 
penalty can be imposed. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03(C) (E). 
Lockett bases her assertion primarily on United States. v. 
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which held that the sentencing 
provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act, 18 u.s.c. § 120l(a), 
was an unconstitutional burden on the right to contest one's 
guilt before a jury. The Federal Kidnaping Act, as construed 
by the Court in Jackson, permitted the imposition of the death 
penalty only if the defendant insisted on a jury trial. If the 
defendant pleaded guilty or waived his right to a jury trial 
the maximum penalty was life imprisonment. In striking down 
the sentencing provision, the Court noted that it had the 
"inevitable effect"of discouraging defendants from exercising 
their Fifth Amendment right to plead not guilty and their Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. Id., at 581. The "chill" on 
the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights was 
unnecessary because there were alternative methods of limiting 
the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommended it. 
Id., at 582. 
/c;,\ 
Lockett ar- s that Ohio's sentencing--ocess discourages 
the exercise of constitutional rights in a manner similar to 
that which concerned the Court in Jackson. She contends that 
the imposition of the death penalty is much less likely when a 
defendant pleads guilty and the trial judge is free to impose a 
life sentence than it is when the sentencer can avoid a death 
penalty only by finding one of three mitigating circumstances. 
She also contends there is a significantly lesser chance that 
the death penalty will be imposed when a three-judge panel must 
unanimously find that none of the three mitigating 
circumstances exist than there is when a single trial judge 
must make the same determination individually. Thus, she 
argues, Ohio's sentencing procedure needlessly and effectively 
encourages the waiver of constitutional rights contrary to the 
commands of Jackson. 
The statutory provisions challenged in this case, however, 
are significantly different from Jackson in two respects. 
First, a defendant has much less incentive to waive his 
constitutional rights under the Ohio procedure where there is 
/J 
only a possib . ty of a better chance to e oid the death I<;' 
penalty than a defendant had under the Kidnapping Act. Under 
that statute he could eliminate the possibility of a death 
sentence altogether by waiving his rights. It is true that 
Jackson focused on the lack of any justification for the 
"chill" rather than the degree of the burden on the 
constitutional rights involved. But Jackson does not stand for 
the proposition that no burden on the exercise of 
constitutional rights no matter how slight may be tolerated. 
Justice Harlan made the point well writing for the Court, 
subsequent to Jackson, in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 
213 (1971), where he rejected the contention that Ohio's 
practice of determining guilt and sentence in a single trial 
was an impermissible burden on the right to remain silent, and 
said: 
The criminal process, like the rest of the 
legal system, is replete with situations 
requiring "the making of difficult 
judgments" as to which course to follow .••. 
Although a defendant may have a right, even 
of co- itutional dimensions, to 4!t>llow 
whichever course he chooses, the 
Constitution does not by that token always 
forbid requiring him to choose. The 
threshold question is whether compelling the 
election impairs to an appreciable extent 
any of the policies behind the rights 
involved. 
The Ohio sentencing procedure may have some tendency 
to encourage defendants to waive their constitutional right to 
a jury in the belief a judge is more likely to show mercy for 
one reason or another, or on the theory that there is less 
chance of receiving the death penalty from a three-judge panel 
than from a particular judge. But the impairment of 
constitutional rights is much less substantial than that 
presented in Jackson and affords no basis to declare the 
sentencing procedure here unconstitutional. 
Second, the aspects of the Ohio sentencing procedure 
that Lockett attacks, unlike the unconstitutional aspect of the 
sentencing provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act in Jackson, 
cannot be discarded as "unnecessary." 390 U.S., at 583. The 
/f 
incentive to . d guilty provided by Rul--l(C) (3) is no 
/ (/ 
different than in traditional plea negotiation. The same 
considerations that make "the guilty plea and the plea bargain 
•.. important components of this country's criminal justice 
system," Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); see 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, No. 76-1334, U.S. • (1978), 
justify Ohio's decision to permit a trial judge greater freedom 
in sentencing a defendant who pleads guilty than to a defendant 
who pleads not guilty. 
Practical considerations also justify Ohio's use of a 
single judge to sentence in jury trials and a three-judge 
tribunal to sentence when a jury trial has been waived. A 
judge who has presided over a defendant's trial, possesses a 
degree of familiarity with the nature of the offense and the 
defendant not possessed by other judges if brought into the 
sentencing process at that point. On the other hand, when a 
tribunal of three judges presides over a defendant's trial, 
each judge becomes intimately familiar with the facts and the 
defendant and can render valuable assistance in sentencing. 
Ohio is entit l9 to take advantage of in1thts of all the 
/Y 
judges who sit at a non-jury trial but to decline to provide 
three judges, in addit i on to a jury, when the defendant demands 
a jury trial. Accordingly, we reject Lockett's contention that 
the Ohio sentencing procedure unconstitutionally chills the 
right to plead guilty or demand a jury trial. 
c. 
Finally, Lockett contends that the Ohio sentencing 
procedure impermissibly forced her to bear the burden of 
persuasion as to the existence of mitigating factors. She 
argues that the state should be required to prove the absence 
of mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. We have never held 
s 
that the Constitut ion require the state to bear the burden of 
A 
1-k ~ 
prov ing that negative beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant has ? 
been found guilty of the offense and we decline to do so now. 
See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
/ III. We turn now to a more substantial issue. Lockett ~ ---
contends that her sentence is invalid because the statute under 
which it was ilfsed did not permit the s . encing judge to 
give adequate weight to mitigating factors such as her 
character, record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death 
and her relatively minor part in the crime. To address it from 
the proper perspective, it will be helpful to review the 
developments in recent cases in which we have applied the 
Eighth Amendment to death penalty. These cases make clear that 
we are not writing on a "clean slate." 
A. 
Prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S 238 (1972), every 
state that authorized the death penalty had abandoned mandatory 
death penalties,1/ permitting unrestrained jury discretion 
regarding the imposition of the death penalty in a particular 
capital case.I/ Ma ndatory death penalties had proved 
unsatisfactory, as the plurality noted in Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976), in part because juries 
"with some regularity disregarded their oaths and refused to 
convict defendants where a death sentence was the automatic 





Prior. o Furman, the Court had neer intimated that 
discretion in sentencing offended the Constitution in any way. 
On the contrary, the Court had suggested that some degree of 
discretion might be necessary. See, Pennsylvania ex rel. 
Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 
585 (1959). As recently as McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183 (1971), the Court had specifically rejected the contention 
that sentencing discretion regarding the death penalty violated 
the fundamental standards of fairness embodied in Fourteenth 
Amendment due process, id., at 207-08, and had asserted that 
states were entitled to assume that "jurors confronted with the 
truely awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow 
human being [would ] act with due regard for the consequences of 
their decision." Id., at 208. 
The constitutional status of discretionary sentencing 
in capital cases changed abruptly, however, as a result of the 
~/WIit _......-... 
~
separate opinions supporting the judgment in Furman. The 
question in Furman was whether "the imposition and carrying out 
'/ 
of the death p- l ty [in the cases before e e Court] 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 408 U.S., at 239. Two 
Justices concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited th~ 
death penalty altogether and voted to reverse the judgments 
sustaining the death penalties on that ground. 408 U.S. at 
305-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 370-371 
(Marshall, J., concurring). Three Justices were unwilling to 
hold the death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment, but voted to reverse the judgments on other 
grounds. In separate opinions, the three concluded that 
7 
systems of discretionary sentencing unless unguided by 
legislatively defi ned standards violated the Eighth Amendment 
becau se they were "pr egnant with discrimination," Furman v. 
Geo r gia, 408 U.S. a t 257 (Douglas, J. concurring), because they 
permitted the death penalty to be "wantonly" and "freakishly" 
imposed, id. at 310 (Stewa r t, J. concurring), and because they 
imposed the death penalty with "great infrequency" and afforded 
"no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which 
~o 
it rwas) impose from the many cases in w. h it [was) not," 
id. at 313 {White J. concurring). Thus what had been approved 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
McGautha became impermissible by virtue of the judgment in 
Furman, which turned on the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. 
See, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n. 47 (1976) (opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.). 
Predictablyll, the variety of opinions supporting 
the judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what was 
required in order to impose the death penalty in accord with 
the Eighth Amendment. Some states responded to what was 
thought to be the command of Furman by adopting mandatory death 
penalties for a limi ted category of specific crimes thus 
eliminating all d iscretion from the sentencing process in 
cap i tal cases. Othe r states attempted to continue the practice 
of individually assessing the culpability of each individual 
defendant convicted of a capital offense and, at the same time, 
to comply with Furman, by providing standards to guide the 
sentencing decision.!/ 
~/ 
Four eirs after Furman, we cons- red Eighth 
Amendment issues posed by five of the post-Furman death penalty 
statutes.1/ Four Justices took the position that none of the 
five statutes violated the Eighth Amendment. Two Justices _ took 
the position that none of five statutes complied. The 
disposition of each case varied according to the votes of a 
plurality of three Justices who delivered a joint opinion in 
each of the five cases upholding the constitutionality of the 
statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, but holding 
unconstitutional the statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana. 
The plurality reasoned that to comply with Furman, 
sentencing procedures should not create "a substantial risk 
that the death penal ty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 188. In the 
view of the plurality opinions in Gregg, and its companion 
cases, however, Furman did not require that all sentencing r discretion be eliminated, but only that it be "directed and 
limited," id., at 189, so that the death penalty would be -
imposed in a consistent and rational manner and so that there 
~~ 
cl:> 
would be a "me- ngful basis for distingu- ing the .. . cases 
in which it is imposed from •.. the cases in which it is 
not." Id. at 188. The plurality also concluded that the 
sentencing process must permit consideration of the "character 
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of 
- - ----------------y the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part ------------------------------
of the process of inflicting the penalty of death," Woodson v. 
North Carolina, supra, at 304, in order to ensure the 
reliability, under Eighth Amendment standards, of the 
determination that "death is the appropriate penalty in a 
✓ 
specific case." Id. at 305; see Roberts, (Harry) v. Louisiana, 
431 U.S. 637 (1977}; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-72 
(1976}. 
The plurali ty opinions, which controlled the 
dispo sition in Gregg and its companion cases, resulted in a 
holding that certain legislative standards must be provided to 
guide the imposition of capital punishment in order to comply 
with the Eighth Amendment. In these evolutionary developments 
since 1971, the states have been obliged to revise their death 
penalty statu - to comply first with Fur and later with the ~ 
strictures of Gregg, and its companion cases. Candor requires 
acknowledgement that in this difficult and sensitive area of 
the l aw, the Court has not provided the clarity which can be 
--------
achieved in many other areas; this is not unusual in 
constitutional adjudication. The task of providing clear 
guidance in constitutional adjudication on capital punishment, 
binding in more than fifty jurisdictions is, however, a major 
obl i gation of the Court. We see our task now as requiring that 
I 
we reconcile previously differing views to fulfill that 
,-,,, ........... ......,~ 2--o~ 
obligation with the maximum clarity possible. 
B. 
Once a de fe ndant is convicted of aggravated murder and 
at least one of seven specified statutory aggravating 
circumstances, the Oh io death penalty statute, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2929.03(E) (1975 Repl. Vol.), requires that the death 
penalty be imposed unless, considering "the nature and 
curcumstances of the offense and the history, character, and 
condition of the offender," the sentencing judge determines 
that at least - of the following mitigae g circumstances is 
established by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(1) The victim of the offense induced or 
facilitated it. 
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have 
been committed but for the fact that the offender 
was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation. 
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the 
offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though 
such condition is insufficient to establish the 
defense of insanity. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann Sec. 2929.04{B) {1975 Repl. Vol.). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the mitigating 
circumstances should "be liberally construed in favor of the 
accused," State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 281 {1976); State 
v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 77, 86 (1976), and that the 
sentencing judge or judges may consider factors such as the age 
and criminal record of the defendant "in determining whether any 
of the mitigating circumstances exist," State v. Bell, 48 Ohio 
St. 2d., at 281. But nothing beyond the three specified in the 
. I 




id., at 281-82- As construed by Ohio's ce t, the defendant's 
age, prior criminal record, and the degree of the defendant's t~ 
involvement in the crime are not independent mitigating 
factors. See State v. Bayless, supra, at 87 n. 2. Once it is 
determined that the victim did not induce or facilitate the 
offense, that the defendant did not act under duress or 
coercion, and that the offense was not primarily the product of 
the defendant's mental deficiency, the defendant must be 
sentenced to death. It matters not that he may be a youthful ---
first offender with reasonable future prospects or one who 
played onl 
~
minor role in the criminal enterprise. 
the Ohio statute is essentially that 
1 l ~~ -.... _,,, ,, 
individualized sen tencing is a constitutional requirement of the 
Eigh th Amendment i n capital cases and that the Ohio statute does 
not meet that standard. She relies, to a large extent, on the 
plurality opinions in Woodson, supra, at 303-05, Roberts, supra, 
at 333-34, and Jurek, supra, at 271-73, although in some 
respects her contention goes beyond them. 
The conce. f individualized senten. , in both capital 
and non-capital cases, has long been widely accepted as 
"enlightened policy," Woodson, supra, at 304, in this country. 
See a l s ----, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949)_. 
Under the practices that have evolved, especially after the 
advent of indeterminate sentences, sentencing judges have taken 
into account a wide range of factors, often including elements 
not specified by statute and continue to do so in most cases 
today. 
In some cases, for example, a driver of a get-away car in a 
bank robbery may receive a lighter sentence than the robber who 
actually entered the bank; a youthful offender may be treated 
less harshly than a mature criminal; a first offender, less 
severely than a recidivist. Practically any aspect of the 
cha r acter and record of the offender or any circumstance of his 
offense may influence the penalty. Mr. Justice Black, speaking 
for the Cour t in Williams v. New York, supra, at 24~ 
~ 1-4../ d,K..<.... "'- -<!!l:::,1/r/U"d4C.4.,1 -1 7 
capital case -- described ~t ~ in ~ capital and 
non-capital cases when he said: 
"A senten. judge ... is not confe d to the 
narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed 
q, 
statutory or constitutional limits is to ~ 
determine the type and extent of punishment after ~ . 
the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly ~~1~ 
1 
relevant -- if not essential -- to his selection {j)~ / 
of an appropriate sentence is the possession of ~ 
the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant's life and characteristics. And modern 
concepts individualizing punishment have made it 
all the more necessary that a sentencing judge 
not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent 
information by a requirement of rigid adherence 
to restrictive rules of evidence properly 
applicable to the trial. 
"Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize ? 
a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that 
the punishment should fit the offender and not 
merely the crime. People v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 
387, 392, 169 N.E. 619 621. The belief no longer 
prevails that e very offense in a like legal 
category calls for an identical punishment 
without regard to the past life and habits of a 
particular offender. This whole country has 
traveled far from the period in which the death -sentence was an automatic and commonplace result ---of convictions -- even for offenses today deemed 
trivial." 
r?( 
In Willia- •r. New York, the Court w'4tnot dealing with 
Eighth Amendment claims but with due process claims made 
- -------------~--------
applicable to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
o?)I 
T~ 
relevance of Williams to this case is the Court's emphasis on 
the need in all kinds of cases for the fullest information 
~ '# :::::>:G - CD4 ~ 
rq r( 
_,, V 
~~~ - --;/;; possible concerning the defendant's life, background, and • 
characteristics. "And modern concepts of individualized 
punishment," as Mr. Justice Black emphasized, "have made it all 
the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an 
opportunity to obtain pertinent information." Id. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Even prior to Williams, the Court had recognized the 
importance of indiv i dualized sentencing when it observed in 
Pennsylvania ex. re l . Sullivan v. Ashe, supra, at 55, that 
"just i ce generally requires" that the "circumstances of the 
offense together with the character and propensities of the 
offender" be taken into account in sentencing. 
The factors and considerations which have made 




concept reaso- ly calls for a clear decleation that it is 
mandated by the Eighth Amendment in capital punishment cases. 
Given the severity and finality of the death penalty, the need 
for treating defendants as "uniquely individual human beings," 
Woodson, supra, at 304, is vastly more important when life is 
at stake than in non-capital cases. We, therefore, conclude 
the Eighth Amendment requires that consideration of the broad -
range of factors, long accepted as a matter of enlightened -----
public policy in both capital and non-capital sentencing, must 
be permitted in capital cases. The range of factors should --
include, among others, the degree of participation in the 
criminal conduct, record of prior offenses, age, proof or lack 
of specific intent to cause the death of the victim, and any 
other aspect of a defendant's life that the defendant proffers 
as a basis for a sentence less than death. 
The Ohio statute did not permit the direct consideration of 
the factors required for individualized sentencing in this case 
and therefore did not comply with the Eighth Amendment. 
~ () 
rJ e 
The judgme of the Ohio Supreme Cou - must be reversed to . 
the extent that it upholds the imposition of the dealth penalty 
in this case. 
IV. 
In addition to the constitutional challenges to her 
sentence, Lockett raises several other issues regarding the 
validity of her conviction. She contends that the prosecutor's 
closing remarks violated her right under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment. The prosecutor's repeated comment that 
the state's evidence was "unrefuted" as well as other aspects 
of the closing argument, she argues, were direct allusions to 
her failure to testify and thus violated Griffin v. California, 
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1 965}. We conclude, however, that the 
errors here, if a ny, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Loc kett's own counsel had clearly focused the jury's attention 
on her silence first by outlining her contemplated defense in 
his opening statement and, near the close of the case, stating 
to the court and jury that Lockett would be the "next 
witness." The prosecutor's remark that the state's evidence 
7/ 
was uncontrad - ed added nothing to the e ression that had 
already been created by Lockett's refusal to testify after the 
jury had been promised a defense and told that Lockett would 
take the stand. 
B. 
Lockett also contends that four prospective jurors were 
excluded from the venire in violation of her Sixth Amendment 
rights under the principles established in Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975), and Witherspoon v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 510 (1968). We do not agree. 
On voir dire, the prosecutor told the venire that there was 
a possibility that the death penalty might be imposed, but that 
the judge would make the final decision as to punishment. He 
then asked whether any of the prospective jurors were so 
opposed to capital punishment that "they could not sit, listen 
to the evidence, listen to the law and make their determination 
solely upon the evidence and the law without considering the 
fact that capital punishment" might be imposed. Four of the 
venire responded affirmatively. The trial judge then addressed 
./~ 
• 
the following - estion to those four ven - men: 
[D]o you feel that you could take an oath 
to well and truly try this case .•• and 
follow the law, or is your conviction so 
strong that you cannot take an oath knowing 
that a possibility exists in regard to 
capital punishment? 
Each of the four specifically stated twice that they would not 
"take the oath." Lockett's attorney stated that he had no 
objection to excusing those veniremen. Accordingly, they were 
properly excused under Witherspoon or Taylor, supra. 
c. 
Lockett's final contention that the Ohio Supreme Court's 
interpretation of t he complicity provision of the Ohio Code 
provision under which she was convicted, Ohio Rev. Code§ 
5) 
2923.03 (A) (1975 Repl Vol.), was so unexpected that it deprived 
her of a fair warning of the crime with which she was charged. 
The opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court shows clearly that its 
construction of the statutory provision was in accord with 
established Ohio law and clear legislative history. Lockett 
cannot be saie o have lacked a fair war e g of the meaning of /7 
& 
the criminal statute which she violated. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme 
Court is reversed insofar as it upheld the imposition of the 
death penalty and the case is remanded for proceeding not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
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~ Dear Chief: 
This is in response to your suggestion that we • 
give you our comments in writing. Although I fuJJ.y agree 
with your conclusion on the Eighth Amendment issue, I am 
having difficulty with two aspects of your draft opinion . 
First, in holding that the Eighth Amendment 
requires the sentencing authority to consider all relevant 
mitigating circumstances, you rely extensively and almost 
exclusively on dicta in Justice BJack's opinion for the 
Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The 
issue in Williams was not whether the sentencing authority 
must consider mitigating circumstances, but whether it may 
consider evidence in sentencing that would not have been 
admissible at the trjal on guilt. The Court there he]d 
only that consideration of such evidence did not violate 







~. ~t ,. 
.. :;;. k. ~ ·t ~-
It seems to me that more specifically focused 
support for your Eighth Amendment hoJding in this case 
could be derived from the plurality opinion in Woodson. 
There the history of the growth of individualized 
sentencing was traced in detail, with particular attention 
to capital sentencing . 428 U.S., at 289-301 . In addition, 
the conclusions that were drawn tied explicitly to the 
Eighth Amendment concepts of .. evolving standards of 
decency," id . , at 301, and of "the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment," id., at 304. At 
the same time, it was made clear that the conclusions 
. -.."""'-"-
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"rest fed] squarely on the predicate that the penalty of 
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long." Id., at 305. Although I 
understand that you did not agree with that opinion at that 
", .. - -,,;• ·:.-.iri~ ~?}'.:-_= :{;:';::;t~:,,1 
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time,~ believe that theie is much in that opinion that 
tracks your reasoning and supports your holding here. In 
order not to leave the mistaken impression that the Court 
• s now taking a fundamentally different tack from that of 
the plurality in Woodson and the other J976 cases, wouJ.d it 
not be desirable to draw primarily on the Woodson opinion? 
My second concern is that the Court not leave any 
question as to the continued validity of the statutes 
upheld in Proffitt and Jurek. Your opinion holds that "the 
Eighth Amendment requires •.• consideration of [al broad 
range of factors," including "among others, the degree of .-
participation in the criminal conduct, record of prior 
offenses, age, proof or .lack of specific intent to caus·e 
the death of the victim, and any other aspect of a 
defendant's life that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence J ess than death." Opinion at 30. The 
Florida statute at issue in Proff; tt, however, 1 i. st.ed only 
a set of seven statutory m~tigating c i r~umstances •. t 428 ~ 
U.S., at 249 n. 6. ':'J'Thus, the a r gument could be made tnat· 
the Florida statute ~did~not al l ow the sentencing authority 
to conside_r "any • - • ~t , aspect of the defendant's life that 
the defe!},dant proffers as a _bas i s- for a '.ii1entence 'l ss than 
death." ~~•.~,.:.:~ 
.;, _ :' This argument wouldTu fa~l, in my v.J ~~7 -because as 
the plurality noted in Proffitt, the .) i st of mi.tigating 
factors in the Florida statute aoes bot purport to be an 
exclusive list: · · 
"(T]he capital-sentencing stattiti ~xplicitJy 
-~ provides that '[a]ggravating circuistances shal 
be limited to the f~llowing (eight specified 
factors.}.' §931.141(5) (Supp. 1976-1977). ·· 
(Emphasis added.} There is no such limiting 
:language introducing the list of statutory 
mitjgating factors. See §921.141(6) (Supp • 
.. J 976-.1977) • " - . 
428 U.S., at 250 n. 8. Since the judgment jn Proffitt 
proceeded on the assumption that the statutory list of 
mjtigating factors was not exclusive, there is no 
:1"1 inconsistency with your holding in this case. 
·~ ! 
The Texas statute at issue in Jurek required the 
jury to answer three questions at the sentencing stage. · 
428 U.S., at 269. The question for the plurality; in Jurek, 
as for the Court in the instant case, was whethe~, these 
three statutory questions allow sufficient individualized 
consideration of the offender and offense to satisfy the 
Eighth Amendment. See id., at 271-272. The plurality was 
satisfied that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had 
construed the second statutory question - "whether there is 
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society" - so broadly as nto allow a defendant to bring to 
the jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he 
may be able to show." Id., at 272, citing and quoting 522 
s.w.2d, at 939-940. Thus, despi.te the facial narrowness of 
the statutory inquiry under the Texas statute, the Texas 
court - unlike the Ohio court here - had construed its 
statute to allow consideration of any mitigating factor to 
which the defendant could point. It was explicitly on this 
basis that the plurality upheld the Texas statute, and it 
is on thls basis that Jurek differs from the Ohio statute. 
But in view of the arguable similarities between 
the statutes at issue in Proffitt and Jurek and the Ohio 
statute at issue here t · I think it would be prudent for the 
Court to make clear the distinctions between those cases 
and this one. 
One further thought: Do you think the broad 
generalizations as to "indlvidualizerl sentencing• by judges 
can be read to reflect doubt on the validity of 
indeterminate sentencing that we have approved {~.9.., r' 
Calif.)? And what about statute severely limiting judicial 
discretion in sentencing, such as mandatory minimum terms? 
-
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-~U:JTUllt.t (!}llltrl cf tlf t ~b ~hdtg 
:Jlf rur~ J. ~ 2llffe'! ~ 
June 14, 1978 
No. 76-6997, Lockettv. Ohio 
Dear Chief, 
/ 
My suggestions with respect to your 
proposed opinion parallel almost exactly those 
expressed by Lewis in his letter to you of today. 
My only qualification, with which I am sure Lewis 
would agree, is that reliance not be placed on 
the Eighth Amendment simpliciter, but on its 
incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, since 
this is a state case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 





;iu:prmu QJqmt of ~ 'Jltnift~ ~bdt,g 
'.Jll'mdpnghm. J. OJ. 2llffe'l, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 16, 1978 
RE: "76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
Although I do not qualify my join, I think the 
suggestions which Lewis made in his letter of June 13, 





The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~ - -
j;ttpTrntt <!fcmt cf tqt 'Jllnitdt ~taus 
Jfnslti:ngtcn. tfl. <!f. 20biJ1-,;l 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 20, 1978 
Re: No. 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
1. I agree with parts I, II and IV of your circulation 
of June 9, 1978. 
2. I am unable, however, to concur in your part III. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Roberts v. 
Louisiana and Woodson v. North Carolina, the Eighth Amendment 
requires no more to justify imposition of the death penalty than 
that the jury find beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
has committed the elements of a crime and that the crime is one 
for which death is not a disproportionate penalty. The death 
lA/
1 
penalty statute need not provide a system of aggravating or 
V\ mitigating circumstances or a mixture thereof. 
I am thus unable to join an opinion mandating that to 
satisfy the Eighth Amendment a state must require that the jury 
receive and is free to consider any and all mitigating circum-
stances that the defendant may desire to place before it. I do 
l 
not construe the Eighth Amendment as embodying the theory of 
individualized sentencing or the proposition that the penalty 
must fit the criminal rather than the crime that he has deliber-
ately committed. 
Furthermore, vesting in the jury unlimited authority to 
consider mitigating circumstances is to enhance its power to 
dispense at will its own brand of justice in an essentially 
standardless manner. In the long run, imposing the death penalty 
under such a mandate would revert to that which in my view was 
an unacceptably erratic system that could not be relied upon to 
contribute to any of the ends of criminal punishment. Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (WHITE, J., concurring). 
.-. J 
- 2 -
Of course, the Justices of this Court have an 
obligation to provide clear guidance for the states whenever 
they are in a position to do so. But there are limits to that 
approach, particularly when the suggestion is that we construe 
the Eighth Amendment so as to constitutionalize the rehabili-
tative model of criminal justice, a suggestion that it may take 
longer than I have to accept. 
3. My vote in the Conference to reverse was based on 
the proposition that the imposition of the death penalty should 
be reserved for those who intend to kill and to take human life. 
Otherwise, the penalty is disproportionate and violative of the 
Eighth Amendment. Those who intentionally kill, hire or con-
spire to kill, or anticipate that their colleagues will kill, 
may be punished by death. But I would hold that the Eighth 
Amendment bars the penalty as to those the jury has failed to 
find had the requisite intent to take the life of another person. 
In view of the approach you have taken, I may simply 
dissent rather than alone to concur on the basis of the views 
expressed in paragraph 3 above. 
Sincerely yours, 
~v~ 
The Chief Justice 







To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim Alt 
June 23, 1978 
6:45 p.m. 
~ _/ 
Re: No. 76-6997, Lockett v. Ohio. 
I spoke with Bob Litt, Stewart's clerk, after Stewart 
returned from talking to the Chief. The meeting apparently did 
not go well, but some hope remains. Bob and I are going to 
meet with Henry Parr Saturday afternoon in an attempt tc 
pound out language that will be acceptable to all three Justices 
involved. The plan is that I will show you what we come up 
with first; if you can buy it, Bob will phone it to Justice 
Stewart, who will be out of town; and if he can buy it, Henry 
will show it to the Chief. 
The stumbling block appears to be the Chief's desire to 
tie the "individualized sentencing" point to some historical roots. 
He therefore wants to leave Williams v. New York in the opinion. 
I have some hope that we can work out a compromise that refers 
to the trend toward individualized sentencing as a historical fact, 
without passing judgment on whether it is a good or bad trend. 
I plan to fiddle with the Chief's opinion tonight, and will be 
available to talk with you in the morning. 
JA 
Saturday morning 
I did not reach Henry Parr until late last night. He 
confirms that the meeting did not go well, although the Chief did 





- - 2. 
The Chief did not, however, say anything to Henry about Henry's 
meeting with Bob and me. Henry agreed to meet with us informally 
this afternoon, but he is worried about not compromising his 
position with the Chief. 
Henry also says that the Chief plans to call you today. 
If he does so before lunchtime, I think it would be a good idea 
for you to suggest to the Chief that Henry, Bob, and I get together 
'--" --------------~--------------this afternoon. This will put Henry in a less awkward position 
r---__. 
with the Chief, and it will give the Chief advance notice that 
a compromise may be forthcoming. 
One other point: John Muench, a Stevens clerk, plans to 
sit in on our meeting. John tells me that Justice Stevens is 
having second thoughts about his quick "join," although Henry 
says that Justice Stevens called the Chief yesterday to tell him 
he remains "joined." I do not know where the truth lies in all 
this, but I do think it is a good idea for John to sit in. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell June 23, 1978 
From: Jim Alt ~~ 
Lockett~' Re: The Chief's latest circulation in No. 76-6997, 
v. Ohio. 
I think this draft is at least a 75% improvement over 
the previous draft. In particular, the text from pages 31 
to the end strikes me as quite excellent. In this section 
the opinion recognizes that Woodson and the other 1976 
plurality opinions held that "individualized sentencing" 
is mandated by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in 
capital cases, even though in non-capital cases it "rests 
not on constitutional grounds but enlightened public policy 
Opinion at 32. The opinion also subtly but very effectively 
makes it clear that the statutes upheld in Gregg~ Proffitt, 
and Jurek, survive this decision. See Opinion at 34-36. 
(l\.o~ Finally, the opinion's statement that the 1976 plurality 
"did not clearly indicate ••• which facets of an offender 
. . . 
or his offense it deemed 'relevant' in capital sentencing or 
what degree of consideration of 'relevant facets' it would 
require," Opinion at 32, is perfectly accurate; it presents the 
problem in this case fairly. 
The reason why this draft is not 100% improved is 
that it still includes a rather detailed review of pre-1976 
cases where this Court approved in dic,ta the practice of 
"individualized sentencing" as sound policy. Opinion at 28-31. 
I still am a little uncomfortable with this portion of the opinion, 
II 
- - 2. 
• because it implies rather strongly that newly-enacted state 
laws providing for mandatory sentencing in non-capital cases, 
and similar bills currently under consideration in Congress, 
represent "non-enlightened" policy. I therefore would prefer 
to see this section shrink some more, or disappear altogether. 
At the same time, the opinion also makes it clear that the 
Constitution does not require "individualized" sentencing 
• }
• 
in non-capital cases; and the cases reviewed in this section 
were relied upon to some extent by the Woodson plurality. 
428 U.S., at 304, quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. 
Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937), and citing Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241 (1949) • 
I have the impression that the Chief has been pushed about 
as far as he can go in modifying this opinion for you. I also 
would find the opinion acceptable, although not ideal, as it 
stands. For what it is worth, my strategy at this point would 
be to indicate a willingness to join the opinion; and if one 
of the other members of the Woodson plurality suggests shrinking 
the portion of the opinion discussed above, to agree that that 
is not a bad idea. I also understand that Justice Stewart has 
worked hard to prepare an opinion of his own which now is 
substantially complete. I am afraid that he may be inclined 
to go with it, as long as it is ready. If you agree that 
the Chief's opinion is joinable, you might consider urging 
Justice Stewart to make whatever suggestions to the Chief 
he considers appropriate, and to let his own opinion stay in his 





+o i,Jk; ck 
impasse of 1976 is quite laudable, and one] aOJl!!j the Woodson 
plurality should sacrifice relatively 
style. 
JA 
minor matters of 
3 • 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -.§u.pr mu <.q:!lltrl of firt ~b ~brlt5 
'Jllf rur frnghtn. ~. <.q:. 2!Tffe '!, 
June 26, 1978 
No. 76-6997, Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief, 
Your redraft of pages 27-31 is 
acceptable to me, and I much appreciate 
your efforts. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
,,,, ~ 
/ J ' I I 
/ 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
- -
CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:%u.prtnU <.qcurt .of t~t ~it j>taftg 
Jrrurqingron, ~- <.q. 2ogrJ1, 
June 26, 1978 
76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
MEMORANDUM TO: 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
~ 
Lewis and I spent a substantial period reviewing my 
prior draft and his "Saturday" proposed alternative insert 
for pages 27-31. 
I enclose a merger of his proposal and mine,which he 
authorized me to say is acceptable to him. 
A fresh, full Wang draft will be around soon -- I 
hope. 
~rd~ 
GR£.AT) J,t t,..104 ~ ~ 
~ ry,·, ' 1o ~,--µ ~ 





,. - -Su bs t i tution for Lockett: Start at bottom of page 27 at "B". 
B 
With that obligation in mind we turn to Lockett's attack on 
the Ohio statute. Essentially she contends that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer be given a 
full opportunity to consider mitigating ci r cumstances in 
capital cases and that the Ohio statute does not meet that 
standard. She relies, in large part, on the plurality opinions 
in Woodson, supra, at 303-305, Roberts, supra, at 333-334, and 
Jurek, supra, at 27i-272, but she goes beyond that. We begin 
by recognizing that the concept of individualized sentencing in 
criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally 
required, has long been accepted in this country. See Williams 
~~ 
v. New York, supra; Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 
supra . Consistent with that concept, sentencing judges 
traditionally have taken a wide range of factors into account. 
'• - -2- -
That States have authority, for example, to make aiaers ana 
abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with 
principals, or to enact felony muraer statutes is beyond 
constitutional challenge. But the aefinition of crimes 
generally has not been thought automatically to aictate what 
shoula be the proper penalty. See Pennsylvania ex. rel. 
Sullivan v. Ashe, supra, at 55; Williams v. New York, supra, at 
274-248; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959). And 
where sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been 
agreea that the sentencing juage's "possession of the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics" is "[h]ighly relevant - - if not essential [to] _..___ 
selection of an appropriate sentence . II Williams v. New 
York, supra, at 247. 
-I&& zcq~ 
The opinions of this Court going back many years in aealing 
with sentencing in capital cases have notea the strength of the 
basis for inaiviaualized sentencing. For example, Mr. Justice 
.. - -3- -
Black, writing for the Court in Williams v. New York, supra, at 
247-248 -- a capital case -- observed that the 
"whole country has traveled far from the period 
in which the death sentence was an automatic and 
commonplace result of convictions -- even for 
offenses today deemed trivial." 
Ten years later, in Williams v. Oklahoma, supra, at 585, 
another capital case, the Court echoed Mr. Justice Black, 
stating that 
"in discharging his duty of imposing a proper 
sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if 
not required, to consider all of the mitigating 
circumstances involved in the crime." 
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 245-246 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id., at 297-298 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
339 (MARSHALL, J., concurring); id., at 402-403 (BURGER; C.J., 
dissenting); id., at 413 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); McGautha 
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-203 (1971). Most would agree 
that "the 19th century movement away from mandatory death 
sentences marked an enlightened introduction of flexibility 
- -4- -" 
into the sentencing process." Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 403 
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting). 
Although legislatures remain free to decide how much 
d i scretion in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury 
in non-capita l cases, the plurality opinion in Woodson, after 
reviewing the historical repudiation of mandatory sentencing in 
capital cases, 428 U.S., at 289-298, concluded that: 
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of page 27 to the middle of page 31. , Potter, and hjs 
Chambers, made scrne helpful changei; CJ.n thj_s• .·~-- .. .f 
,(-
The Chief, who was at his residence, agreed that 
we could del5ver our suggested revtsinn to his clerk, Henry 
Parr, and also that the clerks couJd confer. On Sunday 
morning, the Chief advised me that he had not had an 
opportunity to consider our draft. He seemed more 
optjmistic about our getting _together~ ~~ . ""~ 
.,. .r 
r,.-..... ..., ... 
In any event, I encJose a copy of the proposed 
. _ ~1 .. substitute language. If I have correctly understood the 
· .:. ', Chief, I beU eve we are close enough to agree on some 
... >!.-
'<c ( . L 
~; '-. compromise language. It would be a pity for the four of 
l~ --:.---~ 
r-<r 
us, at least, not to work this out. . ~ 
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76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
MEMORANDUM TO: 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
~ 
Lewis and I spent a substantial period reviewing my 
prior draft and his "Saturday" proposed alternative insert 
for pages 27-31. 
I enclose a merger of his proposal and mine,which he 
authorized me to say is acceptable to him. 




. . - -Substi tution for Locke tt: Start at bot tom of p age 27 at "B". 
B 
With that obligation in mind we turn to Lockett's attack on 
the Ohio statute. Essentially she contends that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the s e ntencer be given a 
full opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances in 
capital cases and that the Ohio statute does not meet that 
standard. She relies, in large part, on the plurality opinions 
in Woodson, supra, at 303-305, Roberts, s upra, at 333-334, and 
Jurek, supra, at 27i-272, but she goes beyond that. We begin 
by recognizing that the concept of individualized sentencing in 
criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally 
required, has long been accepted in this country. See Williams 
v. New York, supra; Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 
supra. Consistent with that concept, sentencing judges 
traditionally have taken a wide range of factors into account. 
- -2- -• 
That States have authority, for example, to make aiders and 
abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with 
principals, or to enact felony murder statutes is beyond 
constitutional challenge. But the definition of crimes 
generally has not been thought automatically to dictate what 
should be the proper penalty. See Pennsylvania ex. rel. 
Sullivan v. Ashe, supra, at 55; Williams v. New York, supra, at 
274-248; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959). And 
where sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been 
agreed that the sentencing judge's "possession of the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics" is "[h]ighly relevant - - if not essential [to] 
selection of an appropriate sentence . II Williams v. New 
York, supra, at 247. 
_f:iliilL . - t~ 
The opinions of this Court going back many years in dealing 
with sentencing in capital cases have noted the strength of the 
basis for individualized sentencing. For example, Mr. Justice 
• - -3- -
Black, writing for the Court in Williams v. New York, supra, at 
247-248 -- a capital case -- observed that the 
"whole country has traveled far from the period 
in which the death sentence was an automatic and 
commonplace result of convictions -- even for 
offenses today deemed trivial." 
Ten years later, in Williams v. Oklahoma, ·supra, at 585, 
another capital case, the Court echoed Mr. Justice Black, 
stating that 
"in discharging his duty of imposing a proper 
sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if 
not required, to consider all of the mitigating 
circumstances involved in the crime." 
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S .. , at 245-246 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id., at 297-298 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
339 (MARSHALL, J., concurring); id., at 402-403 (BURGER; C.J., 
dissenting); id., at 413 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); McGautha 
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-203 (1971). Most would agree 
that "the 19th century movement away from mandatory death 
sentences marked an enlightened introduction of flexibility 
·i - -4- -
into the sentencing process." Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 403 
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting). 
Although legislatures remain free to decide how much 
discretion in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury 
in non-capital cases, the plurality opinion in Woodson, after 
reviewing the historical repudiation of mandatory sentencing in 
capital cases, 428 U.S., at 289-298, concluded that: 
/ 
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With that obligation 
attack on the Ohio statute. 
Lockett's 
in mind we turn to JC. ?-; (JJ, 
Essentially she contends that 
a full opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances is 
a constitutional requirement under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases and that the Ohio 
statute does not meet that standard. She relies, in large 
part, on the plurality opinions in Woodson, supra, at --·-
303-305, Roberts, supra, at 333-334, and Jurek, supra, at 
271-272. 
We begin by recognizing that the concept of 
individualized sentencing in criminal cases generally, 
although not constitutionally required, was long ago 
accepted in this country. See Williams v. New York, 
supra; Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, supra . 
Consistent with that concept, sentencing judges 
traditionally have taken a wide range of factors into 




aiders and abettors equally responsible, as a matter of 
law, with principals, or to enact felony murder statutes 
is beyond constitutional challenge. But the definition of 
crimes generally has not been thought automatically to 
dictate what should be the proper penalty. See 
Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, supra, at 55; 
Williams v. New York, supra, at 247-248; Williams v. 
_....,.._ 
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959). And where sentencing 
discretion is granted, it generally has been agreed that 
the sentencing judge's "possession of the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics" is "[h]ighly relevant - if not 
essential ." Williams v. New York, supra , at 247. 
As Members of this Court often have remarked, the ~ 
trend toward individualization of sentencing decisions has 
been strongest and most uniform in capital sentencing. 




which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace 
result of convictions - even for offenses today deemed 
trivial." Williams v. New York, supra, at 247-248; see 
also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 245-246 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id., at 297-298 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); 
id ., at 339 (MARSHALL, J., concurring); id., at 402-403 
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting); id., at 413 (BLACKMUN, J., 
, .-
dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 , 197-203 
(1971). Most would agree that "the 19th century movement 
away from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened 
int roduction of flexibility into the sentencing process ." 
Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 403 (BURGER, C.J., 
dissenting). 
Although legislatures remain free to decide how 
much discretion in sentencing should be reposed in the 
judge or jury in non-capital cases, the plurality opinion 





mandatory sentencing in capital cases, 428 U.S., at 
289-298, concluded that: 
[pick up block quote at middle of page 31] 
--r ·- · 
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To: Mr. Justjce Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
:;L J, - ).. ~ ) G. J ·;fl; )-(51 -;_c11 
Mr. Jus tice Whito 
Mr. Jus tice Marshal l 
''"' ---. Mr. Justice Blackmun ,..... J._ 
..__, I Mr. Jus tice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnqui s t 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
F.rom: The Chief Just ice 
.Circulated: ______ _ 
JUN 2 6 1978 Recirculated: ___ __ _ 
Re: 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
We granted certiorari in this case to consider, among other 
questions, whether Ohio violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by sentencing Sandra Lockett to death pursuant to a 
statutel/ that narrowly limited the sentencer's discretion to 
consider the circumstances of the crime and the record and 
character of the offender as mitigating factors. 
I. 
. Lockett was charged with aggravated murder with the 
aggravating specifications (1) that the murder was committed 
for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or 
- -:1 -2-
J\ 
punishment for aggravated robbery, and (2) that the murd~r was 
committed while committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing 
i~mediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated 
robbery. That offense was punishable by death in Ohio. See 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03 (1975 Repl. Vol.). She was also 
charged with aggravated robbery. The State's case against her 
depended largely upon the testimony of a co-participant, one Al 
Parker, who gave the following account of her participation in 
the robbery and murder. 
Lockett became acquainted with Parker and Nathan Earl Dew 
while she and a friend, Joanne Baxter, were in New Jersey. 
Parker and Dew then accompanied Lockett, Baxter, and Lockett's 
brother back to Akron, Ohio, Lockett's home town. After they 
arrived in Akron, Parker and Dew needed money for the trip back 
to New Jersey. Dew suggested that he pawn his ring. Lockett 
overheard his suggestion, but felt that the ring was too 
beautiful to pawn, and suggested instead that they could get 
some money by robbing a local grocery store and a furniture 
store in the area. She warned that the grocery store's 
r - --3-
_.., 
operator was a "big guy" who carried a "45" and that they would 
have ''to get him real quick." She also volunteered to get a 
gu~ from her father's basement to aid in carrying out the 
robberies, but by that time, the two stores had closed and it 
was too late to proceed with the plan to rob them. 
Someone, apparently Lockett's brother, suggested a plan for 
robbing a pawn shop. He and Dew would enter the shop and 
pretend to pawn a ring. Next Parker, who had some bullets, 
would enter the shop, ask to see a gun, load it, and use it to 
rob the shop. No one planned to kill the pawnshop operator in 
the course of the robbery. Because she knew the owner, Lockett 
was not to be among those entering the pawnshop, though she did 
guide the others to the shop that night. 
The next day Parker, Dew, Lockett, and her brother gathered 
at Baxter's apartment. Lockett's brother asked if they were 
"still going to do it," and everyone, including Lockett, agreed 
to proceed. The four then drove by the pawnshop several times 
and parked the car. Lockett's brother and Dew entered the 




again in two minutes. The robbery proceeded according to plan 
until the pawnbroker grabbed the gun when Parker announced the 
0 stickup." The gun went off with Parker's finger on the 
trigger, firing a fatal shot into the pawnbroker. 
Parker went back to the car where Lockett waited with the 
engine running. While driving away from the pawnshop, Parker 
told Lockett what had happened. She took the gun from the 
pawnshop and put it into her purse. Lockett and Parker drove 
to Lockett's aunt's house and called a taxicab. Shortly 
thereafter, while riding away in a taxicab, they were stopped _\ J:_1_ .... t 
by the police, but by this time Lockett had _placed the gun ) 
under the front seat. Lockett told the police that Parker 
rented a room from her mother and lived with her family, and, 
after verifying this story with Lockett's parents, the police 
released Lockett and Parker. Lockett hid Dew and Parker in the 
attic when the police arrived at the Lockett household later 
that evening. 
Parker was subsequently apprehended and charged with 
aggravated murder with specifications, an offense puni s hable by 
- --5-
: 
death, and aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, he pleaded 
guilty to the murder charge and agreed to testify against 
Lockett, her brother, and Dew. In return, the prosecutor 
dropped the aggravated robbery charge and the specifications to 
the murder charge, thereby eliminating the possibility that 
Parker could receive the death penalty. 
Lockett's brother and Dew were later convicted of 
aggravated murder with specifications. Lockett's brother was 
sentenced to death, but Dew received a lesser penalty because 
it was determined that his offense was "primarily the product 
of mental deficiency, 11 on·e of the three mitigating 
circumstances specified in the Ohio death penalty statute. 
Two weeks before Lockett's separate trial, the prosecutor 
offered to permit her to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter 
and aggravated robbery (offenses which each carried a maximum 
penalty of 25 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, see Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.03, 2911.01, 2929.11 (1975 Repl. Vol.)), 
if she would cooperate with the state, but she rejected the 
offer. Just prior to he r trial, the prosecutor offered to 
- --6-
.! 
permit her to plead guilty to aggravated murder without 
specifications, an offense carrying a mandatory life penalty, 
with the understanding that the aggravated robbery charge and 
an outstanding forgery charge would be dismissed. Again she 
rejected the offer. 
At trial, the opening argument of Lockett's defense counsel 
summarized what appears to have been Lockett's version of the 
events leading to the killing. He asserted the evidence would 
show that, as far as Lockett knew, Dew and her brother had 
planned to pawn Dew's ring for $100 to obtain money for the 
trip back to New Jersey. Lockett had not waited in the car 
while the men went into the pawnshop but had gone to a 
restaurant for lunch and had joined Parker, thinking the ring 
had been pawned, after she saw him walking back to the car. 
Lockett's counsel asserted that the evidence would show further 
that Parker had placed the gun under the seat in the taxicab 
and that Lockett had voluntarily gone to the police station 
when she learned that the police were looking for the 
pawnbroker's killers. The defense was not, however, able to 
- --7-
Parker was the state's first witness. His testimony 
related his version of the robbery and shooting, and he 
admitted to a prior criminal record of breaking and entering, 
larceny, and receiving stolen goods, as well as bond-jumping. 
He also acknowledged that his plea to aggravated murder had 
eliminated the possiblity of the death penalty, and that he had 
agreed to testify against Lockett, her brother, and Dew as part 
of his plea agreement with the prosecutor. At the end of the 
major portion of Parker's testimony, the prosecutor renewed his 
offer to permit Lockett to plea~ guilty to aggravated murder 
without specifications and to drop the other charges against 
her. For the third time Lockett refused the option of pleading 
guilty to a lesser offense. 
Lockett called Dew and her brother as defense witnesses but 
they invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to 
testify. In the course of the defense presentation, Lockett's 
counsel informed the court, in the presence of the jury, that 
he believed Lockett was to be the next witness and requested a 




judge that Lockett wished to testify but had decided to a~cept 
her mother's advice to remain silent, despite her counsel's 
warning that, if she followe d that advice, she would have no 
defense except the cross-examination of the state's witnesses. 
Thus, the defense did not introduce any evidence to rebut the 
prosecutor's case. 
The Court instructe d the jury that, before it could find 
Lockett guilty, it had to find that she purposely had killed 
the pawnbroker while committing or attempting to commit 
aggravated robbery. The jury was further charged th a t one who 
"purposely aids, help~, associates himself or 
herself with another for the purpose of 
committing a crime is regarded as if he or she 
were the principal offender and is just as guilty 
as if the person performed every act constituting 
the offense. . . • " 
Regarding the intent requirement, the court instructed: 
"[A] person engaged in a common design with 
others to rob by force and violence an individual 
or individuals of their property is presumed to 
acquiesce in whatever may reasonably be necessary 
to accomplish the object of their 
enterprise ...• 
- --9-
11 If the conspired robbery and the manner of 
its accomplishment would be reasonably likely to 
produce death, each plotter is equally guilty 
with the principal offender as an aider and 
abettor in the homocide .. An intent to 
kill by an aider and abettor may be found to 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt under such 
circumstances." 
The jury found Lockett guilty as charged. 
Once a verdict of aggravated murder with specifications had 
been returned, the Ohio death penalty statute required the 
trial judge to impose a death sentence unless, after 
"considering the nature and circumstances of the offense" and 
Lockett's "history, character, and condition," he found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the victim had induced 
or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett 
would have committed the offense but for the fact that she "was 
under duress, coercion, or strong provocation," or (3) the 
offense was "primarily the product of [Lockett's] psychosis or 




In accord with the Ohio statute, the trial judge requested 
a pre-sentence report as well as psychiatric and psychological 
·reports. The reports contained detailed information about 
Lockett's intelligence, character, and background. The 
psychiatric and psychological reports described her as a 21 
year old with low average or average intelligence, and not 
suffering from a mental deficiency. One of the psychologists 
reported that "her prognosis for rehabilitation" if returned to 
society was favorable. The presentence report showed that 
Lockett had committed no major offenses although she had a 
record of several minor ones as a juvenile and two minor 
offenses as an adult. It also showed that she had once used 
heroin but was receiving treatment at a drug abuse clinic and 
seemed to be "on the road to success" as far as her drug 
problem was concerned. It concluded that Lockett suffered no 
psychosis and was not mentally deficient.1/ 
After considering the reports and hearing argument on the 
penalty issue, the trial judge concluded that the offense ha d 




deficiency. Without specifically addressing the other two 
statutory mitigating factors, the judge said that he had "no 
alternative, whether [he] li.ke[d] the law or not" but to impose 
the death penalty. He then sentenced Lockett to death. 
II. 
A. 
At the outset, we address Lockett's various challenges to 
the validity of her conviction. Her first contention is that 
the prosecutor's repeated references in his closing remarks to 
the state's evidence as "unrefuted" and "uncontradicted" 
constituted a comment on her failure to testify and violated 
her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). We conclude, however, 
that the errors here, if any, were not violative of 
constitutional prohibitions. Lockett's own counsel had clearly 
focused the jury's attention on her silence first by outlining 
her contemplated defense in his opening statement and, second, 
by stating to the court and jury near the close of the case, 
that Lockett would be the "next witness." When 
- --12-
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viewed against this background, it seems clear that the 
prosecutor's closing remarks added nothing to the impression 
that had already been created by Lockett's refusal to testify 
after the jury had been promised a defense by her lawyer and 
told that Lockett would take the stand. 
B. 
Lockett also contends that four prospective jurors were 
excluded from the venire in violation of her Sixth Amendment 
rights under the principles establishe d in Witherspoon v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 528 (1975). We do not agree. 
On voir dire, the prosecutor told the venire that there was 
a possibility that the death pen a lty might be imposed, but that 
the judge would make the final decision as to punishment. He 
then asked whether any of the prospective jurors were so 
opposed to capital punishme nt that "they could not sit, listen 
to the evidence, listen to the law and make their determination 
solely upon the evidence and the law without considering the 
fact that capital punishment" might be imposed. Four of the 
~ 
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venire responded affirmatively. The trial judge then addressed 
the following question to those four veniremen: 
"[D]o you feel that you could take an oath to 
well and truly try this case .• ~ and follow the 
law, or is your conviction so strong that you 
cannot take an oath knowing that a possibility 
exists in regard to capital punishment?" 
Each of the four specifically stated twice that they would not 
"take the oath." They were excused. 
In Witherspoon, persons generally opposed to capital 
punishment had been excluded for cause from the jury that 
convicted and sentenced the petitioner to death. We did not 
disturb the conviction but we held that "a sentence of death 
cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it 
was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they 
voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed · 
conscientious or . religious scruples against its infliction." 
391 U.S., at 522. We specifically noted, however, that nothing 
in our opinion prevented the execution of a death sentence when 
the veniremen excluded for cause make it "unmistakably 
r 
- --14-
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the 
defendant's guilt." Id., at 523 n.21. 
Each of the excluded veniremen in this case made it 
"unmistakably clear" that they could not be trusted to "abide by 
existing law" and "to follow conscientiously the instructions" 
of the trial judge. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 
(1969). They were thus properly excluded under Witherspoon, 
even assuming arguendo that Wi t herspoon provides a basis for / 
attacking the conviction as well as the sentence in a capital 
case. 
Nor was there any violation of the principles of Taylor v. 
Louisiana, supra. In Taylor, the Court invalidated a jury 
selection system that operated to exclude a "grossly 
disproportionate," id., at 525, number of women from jury 
service thereby depriving the petitioner of a jury chosen from a 
"fair cross-section" of the community, id ·., at 530. Nothing in 
Taylor, however, suggests that the right to a representative 
jury includes the right to be tried by jurors who have 
explicitly indicated an inability to follow the law and 
- --15-
c. 
Lockett's final attack on her conviction, as distinguished 
fiom her sentence, merits only brief attention. Specifically 
she contends that the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
complicity provision of the statute under which she was 
convicted, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 2923.03 (A) (1975 Repl. Vol), 
was so unexpected that it deprived her of fair warning of the 
crime with which she was charged. The opinion of the Ohio 
Supreme Court belies this claim. It shows clearly that the 
construction given the statute by the Ohio court was consistent 
with both prior Ohio law and with the clear legislative history 
of the statute.l/ In such circumstances, any claim of 
inadequate notice under the due process clause must be 
III. 
rejecte) l_,ls,-/.; 
Lockett challenges the constitutionality of Ohio's death 
penalty statute on a number of grounds. We find it necessary to 
consider only one of her contentions. She contends that her 
death sentence is invalid because the statute under which it was 
imposed did not permit the sentencing judge to consider, as 
.. 
- --16-
mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of 
specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in 
the crime. To address her contention from the proper 
perspective, it is helpful to review the developments in our 
recent cases where we have applied the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to death penalty statutes. We do not write on a 
"clean slate." 
A. 
Prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S 238 (1972), every state 
that authorized capital punishmeryt had abandoned mandatory death 
penalties,!/ and instead permitted the jury unguided and 
unrestrained discretion regarding the imposition of the death 
penalty in a particular capital case.1/ Mandatory death 
penalties had proven unsatisfactory, as the plur~lity noted in 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976), in part 
because juries "with some regularity disregarded their oaths and 
refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the 
automatic consequence of a guilty verdict." 
- --17-
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This Court had never intimated prior to Furman that · 
discretion in sentencing offended the Constitution. As recently 
·as McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court had 
specifically rejected the contention that discretion in imposing 
the death penalty violated the fundamental standards of fairness 
embodied in Fourteenth Amendment due process, id., at 207-08, 
and had asserted that states were entitled to assume that 
"jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of 
decreeing death for a fellow human being [would] act with due 
regard for the consequences of their decision." Id., at 208. 
See, Pennsylvania ex rel~ Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 
(1937); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); Williams 
v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959). 
The constitutional status of discretionary sentencing in 
capital cases changed abruptly, however, as a result of the 
separate opinions supporting the judgment in Furman. The 
question in Furman was whether "the imposition and carrying out 
of the death penalty [in the cases before the Court] constituted 
cruel and unusual puni shme nt in violation of the Eighth and 
- --18-
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Fourteenth Amendments." 408 U.S ., at 239. Two Justices 
concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty 
altogether and on that ground voted to reverse the judgments 
sustaining the death penalties. 408 U.S. at 305-306 (Brennan, 
J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 370-371 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). Three Justices were unwilling to hold the death 
penalty per se unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, but voted to reverse the judgments on other 
grounds. In separate opinions, the three concluded that 
discretionary sentencing, unguided by legislatively defined 
standards, violated the Eighth Amendment because it was 
"pregnant with discrimination ," Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 
257 (Douglas, J. concurring), because it permitted the death 
penalty to be "wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed, id. at 310 
(Stewart, J. concurring), and because it imposed the death 
penalty with "great infrequency" and afforded "no meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed 
from the many cases in which it [was] not," id. at 313 (White J. 
concurring). Thus what had bee n approved under the due process 
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in McGautha became 
impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by 
v{rtue of the judgment in Furman. See, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 195 n. 47 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, 
JJ.) • 
Predictably&_/, the variety of opinions supporting the 
judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what was required 
in order to impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth 
Amendment.2/ Some states responded to what was thought to be 
the command of Furman by adopting mandatory death penalties for 
a limited category of specific crimes thus eliminating all 
discretion from the sentencing process in capital cases.~/ 
Other states attempted to continue the practice of individually 
assessing the culpability of each individual defendant convicted 
of · a capital offense and, at the same time, to comply with 
Furman, by providing standards to guide the sentencing 
decision.2_/ 
Four years after Furma n, we considered Eighth Amendment 
issues posed by five of the pos t-Furman death penalty 
( 
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statutes. 1 0/ Four Justices took the position that none of the 
five statutes violated the Constitution; two Justices took the / 
position that none of five statutes complied. Hence, the 
disposition of each case varied acco r ding to the votes of a 
plurality of three Justices who delivered a joint opinion in 
each of the five cases upholding the constitutionality of the 
statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, and holding those of 
North Carolina and Louisiana unconstitutional. 
The plurality reasoned that to comply with Furman, 
sentencing procedures should not create "a substantial risk that 
the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 188. In the 
view of the plurality, however, Furma n did not require that all 
sentencing discretion be eliminated, but only that it be 
"directed and limited," id., at 189, so that the death penalty 
would be imposed in a more consistent and rational manner and so 
that there would be a "meaningful b a sis for distinguishing the 
••• cases in which it is imposed from •. the cases in which 
it is not." Id. at 188. The plurality also concluded, in the 
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course of invalidating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty 
statute, that the sentencing process must permit consideration 
of the "character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death," Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, at 304, in order to 
ensure the reliability, under Eighth Amendment standards, of the 
determination that "death is the appropriate penalty in a 
specific case." Id. at 305; see Roberts, (H a rry) v. Louisiana, 
431 U.S. 637 (1977); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-72 (1976). 
In the last decade, many of the states have been obliged to 
revise their death penalty statutes in response to the various 
opinions supporting the judgments in Furman, supra, and Gregg 
and its companion cases. The signals from this Court have not, 
however, always been easy to decipher. The states now deserve 
the clearest gui~ance that the Court can provide; we have an 
obligation to reconcile previously differing views in order to 
provide that guidance. 
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B. 
With that obligation in mind we turn to Lockett's attack on 
the Ohio statute. i 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer be given a full I 
Essentially she contends that the Eighth and 
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances in capital 
cases and that the Ohio statute does not meet that standard. 
She relies, in large part, on the plurality opinions in Woodson, 
supra, at 303-305, Roberts, supra, at 333-334, and Jurek, supra, 
at 271-272, but she goes beyond them. We begin by recognizing 
that the concept of individualized sentencing in criminal cases 
generally, although not constitutionally required, has long been 
accepted in this country. See Williams v. New York, supra; 
Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, supra. Consistent with 
that concept, sentencing judges traditionally have taken a wide 
range of factors into account. 
That States have authority, for example, to make aiders and 
abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with 
principals, or to enact felony murder statutes is beyond 














generally has not been thought automatically to dictate what 
should be the proper penalty. See Pennsylvania ex. rel. 
Sullivan v. Ashe, supra, at 55; Williams v. New York, supra, at 
274-248; Williams v. Oklahoma, supra, at 585 (1959). And where 
sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been agreed 
------------ -----.. -
that the sentencing judge's "possession of the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant's life and 
characteristics" is "[h]ighly relevant -- if not essential [to] 
selection of an appropriate sentence . " Williams v . New 





The opinions of this Court going back many years in dealing / 
with sentencing in capital cases have noted the strength of the 
basis for individualized sentencing. For example, Mr. Justice 
Black, writing for the Court in Williams v. New York, supra, at 
247-248 -- a capital case -- observed that the 
"whole country has traveled far from the period 
in which the death sentence was an automatic and 
commonplace result of convictions -- even for 











Ten years later, in Williams v. Oklahoma, supra, at 585, 
another capital case, the Court echoed Mr. Justice Black, 
·stating that 
"in discharging his duty of imposing a proper 
sentence, the sentencing judge is authorized, if 
not required, to consider all of the mitigating 
circumstances involved in the crime." (Emphasis 
added) 
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 245-246 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id., at 297-298 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 
339 (Marshall, J., concurring)r id., at 402-403 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); id., at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); McGautha 
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-203 (1971). Most would agree 
that "the 19th century movement away from mandatory death 
sentences marked an enlightened introducti6n of flexibility 
ihto the sentencing process." Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 403 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
Although legislatures remain free to decide how much 
discretion in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury 
in non-capital cases, the plurality opinion in Woodson, after 
i , 
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reviewing the historical repudiation of mandatory senteneing in 
capital case s, 428 U.S., at 289-298, concluded that: 
''in capital case s the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, .•. 
require s consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death." 
Id., at 304. 
That declaration rest e d "on the predicate that the penalty o f 
death is qualitatively different" from any other sentence. 
Id., at 305. We are satisfied that this qualitative difference 
between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of 
reliability when the death sentence is imposed. The mandatory 
death penalty statute in Woodson was held invalid because it 
permitted no consideration of "relevant f a cets of the character 
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances o f 
the particular offense ." Id., at 304. The plurality did not 
clearly indicate, howe ver, which facets of an offender or his 
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offense it deemed ''relevant" in capital sentencing or what 
degree of consideration of "relevant facets" it would require. 
We are now faced with those questions and we conclude that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, 11 / not I 
be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor,1 2/ any / 
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death. We recognize that, in 
non-capital cases, the established practice of individualized 
sentences rests not on constitutional commands but public 
policy enacted into statutes. The considerations that account 
for the wide acceptance of individualization of sentences in 
non-capital cases surely cannot be thought less important in 
capital cases. Given that the imposition of death by public 
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, 
we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision 
is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each 











non-capital cases. A variety of flexible techniques --
probation, parole, work furloughs, to name 
post conviction remedies, are available to 
a few -- and various /~ 
modify an initial I 
sentence of confinement in non-capital cases. The availability 




I respect to an executed capital sentence, underscores the need 
for individualized consideration as a constitutional 
requirement in imposing the death sentence. 13/ l -~~ 
~-
There is no ideal -- and surely no perfect method or 
procedure -- to decide when governmental authority may properly 
be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents the 
sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent 
mitigating weight to every aspect of the defendant's character 
and 1ecord and to the circumstances of the offense creates the 
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors 
which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is 
between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and 




The Ohio death penalty statute does not permit the type of 
individualized consideration of mitigating factors we now hold 
to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in 
capital cases. Its constitutional infirmities can best be 
understood by comparing it with the statutes upheld in Gregg, 
Proffitt and Jurek. 
The statute upheld in Gregg permitted the sentencing 
tribunal to consider "any mitigating circumstances." Ga. Code 
Ann. Sec. 27.2534, l(b) (Supp. 1975)~ see Gregg, supra, at 164, 
197 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens JJ.), id., at 211, 
(opinion of White J., joined by Burger C.J. and Rehnquist J.). 
Although the Florida statute approved in Proffitt contained a 
list of mitigating factors, six members of this Court assumed , 
in approving the statute, that the range of mitigating factors 
listed in the statute was not exclusive. See Proffitt, supra, 
at 250 n. 8 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens JJ.), id ., 
at 260, (opinion of White J. joined by Burger C.J. and 
- -
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Rehnquist J.). Jurek involved a Texas statute which made no 
explicit reference to mitigating factors. Jurek, supra, at 
272. Ra~her the jury was required to answer three questions in 
the sentencing process, the second of which was "whether there 
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society." Tex. ~ode Crim. Proc., Art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-1976); 
see Jurek, supra, at 269. The statute survived the 
petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment attack be cause 
three Justices concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals had broadly interpreted the second question -- despite \ 
its facial narrowness -- so as to permit the sentencer to 
consider "whatever mitigating circumstances" the defendant 
might be able to show. id., at 272-273, (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, and Stevens JJ.) citing and quoting, Jurek 
522 s.w. 2d, 934, 939-940. None of the statutes we 
v. State, I 
sustained 
in Gregg and the companion cases operated to prevent the 
sentencer from considering any aspect of the defendant's 
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character and record or any circumstance of his offense as an 
independently mitigating factor. 
In this regard the statute now before us is significantly 
different. Once a defendant is found guilty of aggravated 
murder with at least one of seven specified aggravating 
circumstances, the death penalty must be imposed unless, 
considering "the nature and circumstances of the offense ~nd 
the history, character, and condition of the offender," the 
sentencing judge determines that at least one of the following 
mitigating circumstances is established by a preponderance of 
the evidence: 
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it. 
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been 
committed but for the fact that the offender was under 
duress, coercion, or strong provocation. 
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's 
psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is 
insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann Sec. 2929.04 (B) (1975 Repl. Vol.) 
- -
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The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that there is no 
constitutional distinction between the statute approved in 
Proffitt, supra, and Ohio's statute, see State v. Bayless, 48 
Ohio St.2d 77, 86-87 (1976), because the mitigating 
circumstances in Ohio's statute are "liberally construed in 
favor of the accused," State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 281 
(1976); see State v. Bayless, supr a, at 86 (1976), and because 
the sentencing judge or judges may consider factors such as the 
age and criminal record of the defend ant "in determining 
whether any of the mitigating ciicurnstances exist," State v. 
Bell, supra, at 281. But even under the Ohio court's 
construction of the statute, only the three factors specified 
in the statute can be considered in mitigation of the 
defendant's sentence. See, id., at 281-82; State v. Bayless, 
supra, at 87 n.2. We see, therefore, that once it is 
determined that the victim did not induce or facilitate the 
offense, that the defendant did not act under duress or 
coercion, and that the offense was not primarily the product of 
the defendant's mental deficiency, the Ohio statute mandates 
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the sentence of death. The absence of direct proof that the 
defendant intended to cause death of the victim is relevant for 
mitigating purposes only if it is determined that it sheds some 
light on one of the three statutory mitigating factors. 
Similarly, consideration of a defendant's comparatively minor 
role in the offense, or age, would generally not be 
as such, to a ffect the sentencing decision. 
permitted, ) C\i,~' 
The limited range of mitigating circumstances which may be 
considered by the sentencer under the Ohio statute is 
incompatible with the Ei ghth and Fourteenth Amendments To me et 
constitutional requirements, a death penalty must not preclude 
consideration of relevant mitigating factors. 
Accordingly, the judgment unde r review is reversed to the 
extent that it sustains the imposition of the death penalty; 
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 




!/ The Ohio statute appears as an appendix to this opinion. 
11 The presentence report also contained information a bout 
the robbery. It indicated that Dew had told the police th a t 
he, Parker, and Lockett's brother had ' plar.~ed the holdup. It 
also indicated that Parker had told the police that Lockett had 
not followed his order to keep the car running during the 
robbery and instead had gone to get something to eat. 
ll See State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 58-62 (1976); 
id., at 69-70 (Stern J. dissenting). 
!/ See Woodson v. North Ca rolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292 n. 25 
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). 
11 See Woodson v. No r th Carolina, 428 U.S., at 291-92; 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n. 11 (1971): 
~/ See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 463 (Burger, C.J. 
dissenting). 
ll The limits on the consideration of mitigating factors 
in Ohio's death penalty statute which Lockett now attacks 
appe ar to have been a direct response to Furman. Prior to 
Fu r man, Ohio had begun to revise its system of capital 
sentencing. The Ohio House of Representatives ha d passed a 
bill abandoning the practice of unbridled sentencing discretion 
and instructing the sentencer to consider a list of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in determining whethe r to impose 
the death penalty. The list of mitigating circumstances 
permitted consideration of any circumstance "tending to 
mitigate the offense, though failing to establish a defense." 
See Sub. H.B. 511, 109 Ohio Ge neral Assembly§ 2929.03, passed 
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by the Ohio House on March 22 (1972); Lehman and Norris, Some 
Legislative History and Comments on Ohio's Ne w Criminal Code, 
23 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 8, 10, 18 (1974). 
Furma n ~as announced du r ing the Ohio Senate Judiciary 
Committee's consideration o f the Ohio House BilY. After 
Furman, the Committee decided to retain the death penalty but 
to eliminate much of the sentencing discretion permitted by the 
House Bill. As a result, the Ohio Senate developed the current 
sentencing procedure which requires the imposition of the death 
penalty if one of seven specific aggravati~g circumstances and 
none of three specific mitigating circumstance s are found to 
exist. Confronted with what reasonably would have appeared to 
be the questionable constitutionality of permitting 
discretionary weighing of mitig a ting factors after Furma n, the 
sponsors of the Ohio House Bill wer e not in a position to mount 
a strong opposition to the Senate's amendments, see L~hman and \ 
I 
Norris, supra, at 19-22, and the statute unde r which Lockett ) 
was sentenced was enacted. 
~/ See e.g., Woodson, supra, at 300 (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal 3d 
420, 446-48, 556 P2d 1101, 1116-18, 134 Ca. Rptr. 650, 665-67 
(1976) (Clark, J. concurring) (account of how California and 
other states enacted unconstitutional mandatory death pe nalties 
in response to Furman); State v. Spe nce, 367 A.2d 983, 985-86 
(Del. 1976) (Delaware legislature and court interpreted Furman 
as requiring elimination of all sentencing discretion resulting 
in an unconstitutional statute); Li e bman and Shepard, Guiding 





Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 Geo. L. J. 757, 765 n. 43 
(1975). 
~/ See Note, Discretion ana the Cons titutiona lity of the 
New Death Pe nalty Sta tutes, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1690 (1974). 
10/ Gr e gg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 15J; Proffitt v. Florida , 
428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); 
Wood son v. North Carolina, supra; ana Robert s , (St an islaus) v . 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
11/ We express no opinion as to whether the need to de te r , 
I 0 /j..JA/ 
certain k i nds of homocide would justify a mandatory death 
sentence as, for example, when a prisoner -- or escapee --
under a life sentence is found guilty of murder. See Robe rt s 
(Ha r ry) v. Louisiana , 431 U. S . , at 637, n.5. 
12/ Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional 
authority of a court to exclude as irrelevant evide nce not 
bearing on the defendant's character, prior record or the 
circumstances of his offense. 
1Jrl,,,eJ-
.UI Sentencing in non-capital cases presents no ( li l ..... comparabl e /, , .L<>,' ·' 
I 
.. . 11. 
problems . We emphasize that in dealing with standards for 
imposition of the death sentence we intimate no vi e w rega r ding 
the authority of a state or of the Congress to fix mandatory, 
minimum sentences for non-capital crimes. 
14/ In view of ou r holding that Loc kett was not sentenced 
- and Fourteenth 
in accord with the Eighth/Amendme nts,we need not address her 
contention that the de a th penalty is constitutionally 
disproportionate for one who has not been proven to have taken 
life, to have attempted to take life, or to have intended to 






disproportionate as applied to her in this case. Nor do we 
address her content ions that the Constitution requires that the 
death sentence be imposed by a jury; that the Ohio statutory 
procedures impermissibly burden the defendant's exercise of his 
rights to plead not guilty and to be tr~~d by a jury; and that 
the statute unconstitutionally required to bear the risk of 





The pertinent provisions of the Ohio death penalty statute are 
as follows: 
S 2929.03 Imposing sentence for a capital 
offense. 
(A) If the indictment or count in the 
indictment charging aggravated murder contains no 
specification of an aggravating circumstance 
listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the 
Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty 
of the charge, the trial court shall impose 
sentence of life imprisonment on the offender. 
(B) If the indictment or count in the 
indictment charging aggravated murder contains 
one or more specifications of aggravating 
circumstances listed in division (A) of section 
2929.04 of the Revised Code, the verdict shall 
separately state whether the accused is found 
guilty or not guilty of the principal charge and, 
if guilty of the principal charge, whether the 
offender is guilty or not guilty of each 
specification. The jury shall be instructed on 
its duties in this regard, which shall include an 
instruction that a specification must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a 
guilty verdict on such specification, but such 
instruction shall not mention the penalty which 
may be the consequences of a guilty or not guilty 
uPrni~t on dnv charae or soecification. 
) 
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(C) If the indictment o~ count in the 
indictment charging aggravated murder contains 
one or more specifications of aggravating 
circumstances listed in division (A) of section 
2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a 
verdict of guilty of the charge but not guilty of 
each of the specifications, the trial court shall 
impose sentence of life imprisonment on the 
offender. If the indictment contains one or more 
specifications listed in division (A) of such 
section, then, following a verdict of guilty of 
both the cha r ge and one or more of the 
specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the 
offender shall be determined: 
(1) By the panel of three judges which tried 
the offender upon his · waiver of the right to 
trial by jury; 
(2) By the trial judge, if the offender was 
tried by jury. 
(D) When death may be imposed as a penalty 
for aggravated murder, the court shall require a 
pre-sentence investigation and a psychiatric 
examination to be made, and reports submitted to 
the court, pursuant to section 2947.06 of the 
Revised Code. Copies of the reports shall be 
furnished to the prose cutor and to the offender 
or his counsel. The court shall hear testimony 




offender, and the arguments, if any, of counsel 
for the defense and prosecution, relevant to the 
penalty which should be imposed on the offender. 
If the offender choos e s to make a statement, he 
is subject to cross-examination only if he 
consents to make such statement under oath or 
affirmation. 
{E) Upon consideration of the reports, 
testimony, other evidence, statement of the 
offender, and arguments of counsel submitted to 
the court pursuant to division (D) of this 
section, if the court finds, or if the panel of 
three judges unanimously finds that none of the 
mitigating circumstances listed in division (B) 
of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code is 
established by a preponderance of the evidence, 
it shall impose sentence of death on the 
offender. Otherwise, it shall impose sentence of 
life imprisonment on the offender. 
§ 2929.04 Criteria for imposing death or 
imprisonment for a capital offense. 
(A} Imposition of the death penalty for 
aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or 
more of the following is specified in the 
indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to 
section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is 




- L/,6 -3-9'-- -
(1) The offense was the assassination of the 
president of the United States or person in line 
of succession to the presidency, or of the 
governor or lieutenant governor of this state, or 
of the president-elect or vice president-elect o f 
the United States, or of the governor-elect or 
lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or of a 
candidate for any of the foregoing offices. For 
purposes of this division, a person is a 
candidate if he has been nominated for election 
according to law, or if he has filed a petition 
or petitions according to law to have his name 
placed on the ballot in a primary or general 
election, or if he campaigns as a write-in 
candidate in a primary of general election. 
(2) The offense was committed for hire. 
(3) The offense was committed for the 
purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, 
trial, or punishment for another offense 
committed by the offender. 
(4) The offense was committed while the 
offender was a prisoner in a detention facility 
as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code. 
(5) The offender has previously been 
convicted of an offense of which the gist was the 
purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, 
committed prior to the offense at bar, or the 
offense at bar was part of a course of conduct 
t 
• • 
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involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to 
kill two or more persons by the offender. 
(6) The victim of the offense was a law 
enforcement officer whom the o f fender knew to be 
such, and either the victim was engaged in his 
duties at the time of the offense, or it was the 
offender's specific purpose to kill a law 
enforcement officer. 
(7) The offense was committed while the 
offender was committing, attempting to commit, or 
fleeing immediately after committing or 
attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated 
arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary. 
(B) Regardless of whether one or more of the 
aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) 
of this section is spe cified in the indictment 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the death 
penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when, 
considering the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history, character, and condition 
of the offender, one or more of the following is 
established by a prepondence [preponderance] of 
the evidence: 
(1) The victim of the offense induced or 
facilitated it. 
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would 
have been committed, but for the fact that the 
offend~r was under dur e ss, coercion, or strong 
nrnvn~rltion. 
- -l )_ -4J--
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( 3) The offense was primarily the product of 
the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, 
though such condition is insufficient to 
establish the defense of insanity. 
-
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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~u:puntt <!}01trl cf tJr.t ~h' ~hd.tg 
Jl'ml'.lfutgLm. ~. Cl}. 2.llffe)l.$ 
June 27, 1978 
RE: No. 76-6997 - Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Resjlully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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1978 CH A MBERS OF 
JU S TICE B YRO N R. WHITE 
June 27, 
J 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 76-6997 - Sandra Lockett v. The State of Ohio 
76-6513 - Willi e Lee Bell v. The State of Ohio 
I ma y eventually get this right but maybe not. 
The opening of my opinion in these cases should read 
as follows: 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting in 
part and concurring in the judgments of 
the Court. 
I concur in Parts I and II of the 
Court's opinion in No. 76-6997, Lockett 
v. Ohio and Part I of the Court's 
opinion in No. 76-6513, Bell v. Ohio 
and in the judgments. I cannot,7iowever, 
agree with Part III of the Court's opinion 
in Lockett and Part II of the Court's 





JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-.§nprmu QJ.anrl ttf tJrt ~h .§htltll 
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June 27, 1978 
Re: No. 76-6997, Lockett v. Ohio 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your 
opinion. 
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